Backtalk: A broken, bullying command structure

[CommunityEditor]

I read with great interest the March 2 article “Surface standdown,” which outlined the challenges facing the surface fleet. Of note is that the current series of challenges led to a “safety standdown” — something that sounded eerily reminiscent of the “operational pause” ordered last April.

I was inclined to conclude that this standdown probably won’t work, either — meaning that it will not produce real, permanent changes. To order “all stop” is unusual for any organization of any size in any business. Doing so twice in one year may hint at the depth of the problems faced.

At about the same time Navy Times was reporting the series of mishaps that led to the recent standdown, I noticed that I was receiving an increasing number of letters and |e-mails from former students now serving as surface warfare officers. Folks in my business enjoy hearing from former students as a means of keeping in touch with what’s happening operationally, as it provides a great means of fine-tuning what we teach in the classroom.

The typical recent query from these young officers goes something like this: “Why, Professor, is the leadership you teach and the leadership we learn not in line with what we’ve encountered in the fleet?”
One junior officer in Mayport, Fla., |explained: “I typically get thrown off the bridge at least once during a watch by a senior officer in some sort of profanity-laced tirade. Most of the time I have no idea what I did to cause the explosion.”

Maybe there’s more to the recent calamities than “poor seamanship and weak navigation skills” — these being perhaps only indicators of more significant problems. Maybe there’s something more deeply wrong with the SWO culture — something that produces a dysfunctional command climate which erodes effectiveness, teamwork, cohesion and war-fighting skills.

I informally investigated the notion that SWO culture could be inherently dysfunctional. The term “culture” refers to a basic pattern of assumptions and behaviors learned by members of a group or organization as the proper way to think and behave, and includes a general sense of “how things work” in the group or organization. I contacted several SWO junior officers who had recently completed two or more sea tours, asking them two simple questions: “Does a SWO culture exist? And, if so, what is it?” My intent was to get an honest, no-kidding assessment from folks who would know.

A female O-4 select reported: “There’s definitely a SWO culture. Thrive off of getting as little sleep as humanly possible, think Aegis is the greatest thing to happen to the human race, make fun of the folks who ‘don’t get it,’ talk down about the non-watchstanding supply rates, and you’re ‘in.’ It’s a bit like high school. SWOs eat their young. You earn respect for ripping into people and just being generally ‘hard-core.’”

A male O-4 select reported: “SWOs eat their young. Your job: stay on the good side of the bullies, the feared and unrelenting senior officers on your ship. Avoid being on the receiving end of their wrath. I am ashamed to say that I contributed to this culture to avoid finding myself on the other side of the table. To deal with the bullies, you become a bully. And, if you survive, you wear your SWO pin ‘like a badge of honor.’”

These comments provide a classic illustration of in-groups and out-groups, and the enormous amount of wasted energy that goes into their formation and maintenance. Far from reinforcing the value prioritization of ship-shipmate-self, these groups create conflict, inhibit information flow, and have a negative effect on the good order and discipline of the unit.

In fairness, several SWOs reported highly contrasting cultures on their ships which produced inherently positive experiences. These SWOs report senior leaders who are “civilized, respectable, tactful, knowledgeable men” that were like father figures and teachers whom you cared more about letting down than fearing an impending eruption. However, these SWOs were quick to add that theirs was not the normal experience and not indicative of the dominant SWO culture. “My ship was an anomaly,” was a typical refrain.

Unscientific and anecdotal but nonetheless striking, the results would indicate that something is amiss. If the descriptions of the dominant SWO culture are accurate, then it’s no wonder ships are running aground, boats are colliding and sailors are being lost overboard.

Think about it: Verbal abuse. Public degradation. Sleep deprivation. Fear. Temperamental outbursts. High school antics. Bullying. These descriptors are more indicative of hazing rituals than meaningful combat training aspiring to build watch team cohesion and capable war-fighters.

It should be acknowledged that any thoughtful, contemplative leader understands that there are times when emotionally charged engagement and public denigrations might be necessary and appropriate. Purposefully wonton, reckless, replicated behaviors would qualify for such a response.

Another is when the unit commander conducts nonjudicial punishment. Conducting an open captain’s mast on a ship’s fo’c’sle in front of the entire crew might be an appropriate and effective opportunity to abase a sailor who has committed an egregious act or purposeful violation. Open mast not only adjudicates the offense, but also reinforces established professional standards of conduct in a way that heightens the interest of the crew. This right remains only with the unit commander and does not subsequently empower all supervisors to follow suit.

There is little doubt that permanent fixes will require deeper changes to the surface force. So, where can we look to provide insight as to how to |proceed?

We can start by building a proper training environment — one in which specified and implied tasks are identified, the conditions under which the tasks must be accomplished are specified, and acceptable standards are published and enforced. And then we can train to standard, not to time. Fear and condescension are not part of this training package. The setting and enforcing of high standards are.
We would also be wise to heed the advice of Vice Adm. James Bond Stockdale, who argued that “all leadership must be based on goodwill.” During our time |together at Stanford University, Stockdale was fond of the using the phrase “leadership is teachership,” and was quick to add that “every great leader I’ve known has been a great teacher, able to ... set the right moral, social, and motivational climate.” In “Stockdalean” terms, bullying was something in which the bad guys engaged.

We can also learn from Fleet Adm. Chester Nimitz, who presented an imperturbable manner and fatherly mien to his subordinates. Described as having an uncanny ability to properly delegate authority, Nimitz appreciated contrariness. He would undeniably agree with one aspect of the recent standdown message to the surface fleet, which suggests that “COs should be better trained to listen to their subordinates and to try to manage less.”

Finally, we would do well to awaken the spirit of the guidance offered by legendary naval officer John Paul Jones, whose “Qualifications of a Naval Officer” are particularly poignant and relevant to the current challenges facing the surface fleet:

“It is by no means enough that an officer of the Navy should be a capable mariner. He must be that, of course, but also a great deal more. He should be as well a gentleman of liberal education, refined manners, punctilious courtesy, and the nicest sense of personal honor.

“He should be the soul of tact, patience, justice, firmness, and charity. No meritorious act of a subordinate should escape his attention or be left to pass without its reward, even if the reward is only a word of approval. Conversely, he shouldn’t be blind to a single fault in any subordinate, though at the same time, he should be quick and unfailing to distinguish error from malice, thoughtlessness from incompetence, and well meant shortcoming from heedless or stupid blunder.”

Leaders who mentor not menace, develop not demean, challenge not castigate — Jones’ prescription may be the starting point for addressing the problems at hand.

[CDE]

Sorry Professor, sorry NavyTimes, but this is not news. This has been going on for a long time and I thank you for this article. I can only hope that the SWO community will finally take a serious look at themselves. When I went on midshipman cruises I had SWOs openly advising me not to go SWO for many of the reasons that you stated. That was over 10 years ago and I'm confident the environment and culture existed well before then. Your article could easily be turned into a book about SWO culture and its effects, which extend further than groundings and firings. I can only wonder about the actual SWO retention rate.

I did two DIVO tours and it was the most miserable time of my life. After that experience I decided I would either lateral transfer or become a high school teacher. Money can't buy happiness and the SWO bonus is well below my price for being a SWO Department Head.

Back in the day I used to post frequently on SWOnet. All the problems you state were perpetual topics of discussion and I am told that the SWO community leaders would even get briefed on those discussions. So it is not as if junior officers were just silently marching along and not trying to provide feedback up the chain. The SWO mentality manifested itself there also in the form of "suck it up," "stop your crying," and various other dismissive remarks belittling the opinions, observations, and recommendations of JOs on the deckplates. I promise you those kinds of discussions exist right this very second and they are probably even debating your article.

I could talk about this for hours......we're only scratching the surface [pun intended]

[smarg]

Is the Navy becoming a bunch of sissies?

[CDE]

Case in point! An expected response from someone that's part of the problem and not part of the solution.

[forcedj]

In fairness, several SWOs reported highly contrasting cultures on their ships which produced inherently positive experiences. These SWOs report senior leaders who are “civilized, respectable, tactful, knowledgeable men”

Ya know…it could very well be that this explosive inappropriate behavior only happens on isolated ships and maybe that ship wasn’t an anomaly. The above comment made me think of when I was on the JFK back in 1998-2000. They initiated a plan to allow one CPO/SCPO/MCPO qualify for underway OOD. Not surprisingly there were dozens of enlisted khakis that submitted requests to be the one. Can you imagine what an eval bullet it would be for a Chief to say that he/she was a qualified underway OOD on and aircraft carrier? They choose a person and he immediately began the training. However, he never got qual’d due to some other roadblocks that had nothing to do with the program. But the fact that so many wanted to do it said something about the program.



Think about it: Verbal abuse. Public degradation. Sleep deprivation. Fear. Temperamental outbursts. High school antics. Bullying. These descriptors are more indicative of hazing rituals than meaningful combat training aspiring to build watch team cohesion and capable war-fighters.

That sounds like the same things said about the Chiefs community and initiation/inductions. But, for SWO/OOD training I’d think that you’d want some fear. I mean if a person has no fear of loosing his job for running a ship aground then it’ll likely happen a lot more than it does now.


Case in point! An expected response from someone that's part of the problem and not part of the solution.

Concur!

[Variable Wind]

Sorry guys but the way it was described in this article, smarg's observation is correct. Waaaaaaahhhh!!!

[dparker1976]

Your article from Navy Times was forwarded to me by a classmate at the Pentagon and I read it with great interest. I have always believed that there is a fundamental pathology in the surface warfare culture and even though I left active duty in 1983, I have continued to struggle with what the problem is. Although not a week goes by that I do not question whether I should have left, your article instructs me that the culture that frustrated and exhausted me still exists. Although I had experiences with what I consider to be the good and the bad of the officer corps., I write you as one who counts himself as lucky and who by and large was very blessed by the senior officers he worked with. Here are a couple cultural observations of mine from my perspective many years removed:

Tradition: About ten years ago, I toured the USS Constitution and left thinking; “My God, it’s exactly like my DDG”. There seems to me to be an unbreakable paradigm that tells us how a warship is arranged, how it looks and how it functions. The bridge equipment is essentially the same, as is the watch bill. Why is everybody on the ship on the watch bill? Why don’t we drive the ship like a multi-engine aircraft? We let an O-3 command a P-3 but we can’t let one steer a ship? Do we keep a JO up all night driving the ship by telling a Seaman where to point it so the Seaman has to stay up all night too? The OOD gives speed orders to another seaman who operates an integrated throttle. Is it too difficult for an O-2 or 3 to push the throttle around himself? I recall conning my ship through the OOD, in formation, by doing maneuvering boards backwards on a UYA-4 scope with a grease pencil from Combat. I was the tactician, the OOD was the eyes and the sanity check, just like a P-3. What if the conning station on a war ship looked like a P-3 cockpit? Would all the O-5s and above gripe about junior officers sitting down on the bridge? My answer, unfortunately, is probably yes. Which brings me to what I see as the biggest problem:

The Warrior Culture: Almost non-existent. Surface warfare officers do not see themselves as warriors first. My experience is that they see themselves primarily as “operators.” Being a warrior is ennobling, but being an operator is not. All you have to do is look at how young Army NCOs conduct themselves in Iraq and Afghanistan. The character that makes them fierce fighters is the same that makes them motivated, kind, gentle and self-sacrificing. People that don’t understand this will point to Abu Grahib, but they are mistaken. The guards and administration there were not warriors. They were operators. They were isolated and compartmented and became the bullies some of the junior officers in your article described. This is the surface navy I remember, although I would not have used the terms those you interviewed did. In the first two years aboard my ship as a division officer, I had been through an OPPE which the ship passed for the first time in 10 years. I was a SWO, qualified as OOD, EOOW (1200 psi twin plant) and TAO, making me the only officer on the ship that qualified. At the age of 25, I knew how to propel, drive and fight the ship and nobody cared. What was valued was, as you said in your article, sleep deprivation, instilling fear in your NCOs and not watching movies in the wardroom at night. This is how operators act and what they value, not warriors. When I see Petraeus, I see a killer. He is a warrior, and that shows in how he does his business. I see the same in Odierno. I do not see that in many surface warfare officers.

Surface warfare officers should re-evaluate their business and why they’re in it. We must teach all officers, regardless of branch, regardless of rank, that they are warriors and that they are expected to act like it. We must value combat skill and leadership more than the lesser skills that make our day to day lives easier. It’s a tall order, Dr. Horner. I appreciate your article. Good luck. I’ll pray for you.

[Yggdrasil]

Is the Navy becoming a bunch of sissies?

Sorry guys but the way it was described in this article, smarg's observation is correct. Waaaaaaahhhh!!!

Wow, looks like we have a bunch of "tough guys" in here. I suppose it takes a "real man" to let people shit on you and not have a problem with it.

[smarg]

Sorry guys but the way it was described in this article, smarg's observation is correct. Waaaaaaahhhh!!!

Indeed. I might not always be right, but I'm never wrong. :D

[Variable Wind]

Wow, looks like we have a bunch of "tough guys" in here. I suppose it takes a "real man" to let people shit on you and not have a problem with it.

To some extent you have to man-up. Youre a soldier/sailor/marine/airman and your business is war. If you havent figured it out yet, its an inherently aggressive and sometimes demeaning structure to exist in. This isnt today's tee-ball league where everyone gets a trophy, its survival of the fittest.

And like I said "BY THE WAY IT WAS DESCRIBED IN THIS ARTICLE" Smarg's observation was correct. So either it really is a bunch of crying or you need to complain about the person writing the report.

[YomanDenver]

I didn't read through the "book," but isn't this happening in all ranks? The "dangling of the carrot" so to speak. Just because it's in one community doesn't mean it's not happening in other communities.


That sounds like the same things said about the Chiefs community and initiation/inductions. But, for SWO/OOD training I’d think that you’d want some fear. I mean if a person has no fear of loosing his job for running a ship aground then it’ll likely happen a lot more than it does now.

I know I would. I wouldn't want some joe schmo Ensign as the OOD if he had no fear of what COULD happen while he had the deck. I would expect the same out of the Chiefs Mess. What's worse than having a bunch of Chiefs that are only using what they learned while they were First or Second Classes? I have a lot of respect for the Chiefs after seeing some of what they go through outside of the mess. What happens behind those doors is none of my business and that's how it should be.

Suck it up and press on, let's get the Navy out of the "touchy-feely you hurt my feelings" mentality.

[CDE]

Nothing is going to get better until the SWO leadership admits they have a problem. They need to engage in a 12 Step Program. Bonuses, Masters Programs, sabbaticals, etc..., these only treat the symptom of poor rention.

I've been hearing about "lack of leadership," and "we need better leaders" for over 15 years. One big problem in my mind is that SWO life is so screwed up that there are too many good people that get out...and they would be the ones to fix many of the problems.

[Variable Wind]

Nothing is going to get better until the SWO leadership admits they have a problem. They need to engage in a 12 Step Program. Bonuses, Masters Programs, sabbaticals, etc..., these only treat the symptom of poor rention.

I've been hearing about "lack of leadership," and "we need better leaders" for over 15 years. One big problem in my mind is that SWO life is so screwed up that there are too many good people that get out...and they would be the ones to fix many of the problems.

A 12 step program? To avoid hurting your feelings? I guess we should just become the kinder, gentler fighting force then. Im sure China will do the same.

[Yggdrasil]

To some extent you have to man-up. Youre a soldier/sailor/marine/airman and your business is war. If you havent figured it out yet, its an inherently aggressive and sometimes demeaning structure to exist in. This isnt today's tee-ball league where everyone gets a trophy, its survival of the fittest.

And like I said "BY THE WAY IT WAS DESCRIBED IN THIS ARTICLE" Smarg's observation was correct. So either it really is a bunch of crying or you need to complain about the person writing the report.

So in other words, beating each other up and not working as a team wins wars? I learn something new everyday.

BTW - this is the case in every work environment, military and civilian: If people are only motivated by fear of punishment, then they're only going to work just hard enough to not get in trouble. I've seen this happen many times before.

[Variable Wind]

So in other words, beating each other up and not working as a team wins wars? I learn something new everyday.
It takes a big man to admit that.


BTW - this is the case in every work environment, military and civilian: If people are only motivated by fear of punishment, then they're only going to work just hard enough to not get in trouble. I've seen this happen many times before.
Really? Hmm guess you dont work at a SUCCESSFUL private corporation. If I dont do my job, Ill get fired...so I do my job...if I do my job well, I will be rewarded, and if I know the right people, Ill get rewarded more and faster. Thats the nature of the beast and Im sorry if reality isnt something that you subscribe to.

[MPLisa]

Some thoughts:

I was never a SWO - but a Staff Corps Officer (I am retired now). I can attest that it is not just the SWO community that's fouled up - but the Medical COmmunity as well. Nurses, Dentists, Doctors, Podiatrists, Pharmacists -all want to be in charge and "command" a hospital, but few have operational or leadership "sense" or knowledge. They all want to pretent. The FITREP system benefits the butt-kissers and beltway bandits among them. Most of the officers that are O-4 and above are nothing more than ticket-punchers who worry more about medals, ribbons, FITREPS scores and titles, than about the business they are in (i.e. Nurse Corps officers don't really want to be nurses after they make O-4 - they smell "OIC" and want to be that...)

Though the Navy is unique in that the requirement for technocracy is as strong as the requirement for warriorhood (why else would a CVN skipper have to be a nuclear engineer as well as an aviator....?) - I am reminded of the book "About Face" by Colonel David Hackworth - the most highly decorated Army Officer Alive (at the time of the book's writing). Read it and you'll see many parallels with Naval Officerdom that Hackworth comments upon.

[Yggdrasil]

Most of the officers that are O-4 and above are nothing more than ticket-punchers who worry more about medals, ribbons, FITREPS scores and titles, than about the business they are in (i.e. Nurse Corps officers don't really want to be nurses after they make O-4 - they smell "OIC" and want to be that...).

Hell, it's like that on the enlisted side as well. Heck, I don't know if you've ever been attached to NACC Groton, but a couple of the HM1's I knew while I was in Groton were talking about how they were sabotaging (sp?) each other's work in order to get that EP. That's one thing in any other enlisted rate, but when you're in a rate where someone's life is in your hands... it's pretty scary that such an eval system provokes such behavior.

I'm willing to bet that our forced distribution appraisal system is behind what's going on in the original post.

[MPLisa]

Leadership sets the tone on this. The evaluation system as it stands actually inhibits risk taking and innovation and encourages conformity and "do enough to get by" behavior.

[MM SWO]

I am currently in the DH pipeline at Dahlgren and we were just talking about this subject today. One of the LTs was telling a horror story about a truly disfunctional command on his second Divo tour ship. There were about ten others in the conversation and all of them told stories of their Divo tours that were very different. I listened as they told numerous stories of positive mentoring they received from DHs, XOs, and COs duirng both of thier Divo tours. This is in line with both of my Divo tour experiences. I would say, based on my own non-scientific survey (which in my opinion is at least as valid as the article's author), that Mr. Horner's examples are atypical and not the norm.

I have heard all of the horror stories from 80's and early to mid-90's about young being eaten, but I simply have not seen it with my own eyes and have only heard of a couple of ships where that attitude has existed for more than one or two COCs. It takes a while for the old guard to fade away in any organization where there has been a major culture shift. I believe we are seeing that happen at this time.

The good news is that it looks like there are at least eleven new DHs who have seen it done the right way and are committed to making sure that the new attitude thrives for years to come. JPJ's quote is the way the it should be.

As for the lack of sleep and insane tasking, that part is not going to change any time soon. Trying to reduce the manning on ships that don't have the systems or architecture to truly support it, is not helping the situation. Getting rid of SWOS DOC was also a step in the wrong direction. The extra stress it put on the Wardroom and Chief's messes to make up the training that the Ensigns no longer received was very counter productive to the mentoring leadership model that I think we all agree works best. Divos that didn't know what a PMS card was, how to do a zone inspection, or anything about message traffic, ensured that as the culture improved, the workload level would not. We are almost there though. 6 month SWOS DOC, back and better, by 2011! We can do it!

[Yay4SWO]

My opinions are based solely on my own experiences and cannot be applied to the community as a whole but bottom line, the top 6 (highest ranked, fastest qualifying and most respected) out of about 20 O-1 and O-2s from my first ship are either out of the Navy or have laterally transferred to another community. 2 of these JOs held masters degrees before they even reported onboard, 2 were early grads from college and 4 were USNA grads. However, these prior SWOs are NOT headed out to make the big bucks, far from it; we have 1 CEC officer, 1 EDO, 1 Navy Doc, 2 FBI agents and only 1 who left public service to be a college professor.

The SWO junior officer community is full of extremely talented and ambitious individuals who arrive onboard ship with the best intentions and the will to work hard. After their first 2 divo tours, not one of the top 1/3 of JOs would have stayed within the SWO community even if the SWOCP bonus was doubled due to the misery and unnecessary pain they were all put through during their shipboard tours.

For those out there who want to point fingers and call the group a bunch of whiners and sissies, I would just like to remind you that the SWO defectors from my first ship have beaten you at your own game and still decided not to stay. The fact of the matter is that the current SWO regime, or at least my personal experience with it, is perfectly happy retaining mediocre officers. Conformity, not talent, is the preferred characteristic in SWO officers and unless this changes, the community is destined to continue having problems. Even our qualification process plays into this system of conformity. EVERY SWO should have to take a standard, objective written test to wear their pin and only then should they sit on a board. How we currently qualify our JOs is nothing more than “praying at the SWO altar” with the boardees at the whim of the subjective questioning of each board member where the only information that really matters is the “gouge” from previous boards. The absolute subjectivity of these boards makes the subjugation of the boardee to the board members far more important than their actual level of knowledge. My old Department Heads absolutely HATED it when I stood up to them, called them on their BS and proved them wrong. Of course, like any other bully, they always backed down when confronted. But, even I did not dare do that until after I earned my pin.

Unfortunately I don’t see any change in the near future for the SWO community unless surface ships someday return to combat. One of the basic problems is that surface ships have essentially morphed over the years into a garrison force. With deployments action packed with cutting circles in big empty oceans and the harassment of civilian fishing vessels, how can we be considered combat forces? The lack of a true threat on the high seas allow COs to focus on such things as the minutia of writing message traffic (not one of us reading this has not wasted an entire day writing and routing a message that should have taken 1 hour to process and transmit) as opposed to training their JOs on the tactical employment of the ship. This same problem faced the surface and subsurface Navy prior to World War II where it took a few months of combat with the Japanese to shed the dead weight (out of absolute necessity!) and let the cream rise to the top.

The lack of a combat environment has forced officers at all levels to justify their existences by abusing those around them to make themselves feel powerful, and what better target than a green young officer. Like the new kid in school they are in a new environment where they are bound to be self conscious, unsure of themselves and highly trusting of senior officers. It also encourages such behavior as staying awake all night to work on nonsense busywork. How can an officer fight the ship on no sleep? We certainly don’t expect that from our pilots, why would we expect that from our SWOs? Warfighting and combat is a thinking man’s game and failure of an OOD or TAO to get the appropriate amount of rest places the whole ship at risk. The entire thought process is backwards and until we put warfighting above busywork, the culture cannot change.

Ask a Marine Corps battalion commander how important message traffic or the latest NKO training is to him. Then ask him how important junior officer development is to the cohesion and effectiveness of his unit. What do you think he will say?

[MPLisa]

That's the best damned thing I've read in a long time. I would like to mail that to a lot of my friends, and Yay4SWO - unless you are against that, I'm going to do so.

Again I'm riminded of David Hackworth's book: "About Face". Sad, but true.

m

[tmurphy]

THINGS JUST GOT WORSE FOR THE SWO COMMUNITY.......
Hormuz collision has sub, amphib out of action


By Andrew Scutro (ascutro@airforcetimes.com?subject=Question from NavyTimes.com reader) - Staff writer
Posted : Friday Mar 20, 2009 13:07:02 EDT

An attack submarine and an amphib are out of action following a collision Friday during a nighttime transit through the narrow Strait of Hormuz.
The attack submarine Hartford and the amphibious transport dock New Orleans collided at 1 a.m. local time while moving into the Persian Gulf through the narrow passage between Iran and Oman.
Fifteen Hartford sailors were injured in the collision but were able to return to duty. No injuries were reported aboard New Orleans.
Details of the incident remain unclear. Hartford was “submerged but near the surface” at the time of the collision, according to Navy officials.
Both made their way to a local undisclosed port in the aftermath, said Cmdr. Jane Campbell, spokeswoman at 5th Fleet in Bahrain.
“They’re both underway on their own power and both are in the [Persian] Gulf at this point,” she said. “Hartford is on the surface and will remain on the surface until she’s in port.”
Damage to the wounded ships was evaluated at sea and will be more thoroughly examined in port.
Campbell said initial assessments showed two ballast tanks on New Orleans were ruptured, resulting in seawater flooding that required the ship to be stabilized. A fuel tank was also ruptured, causing an estimated 25,000 gallons of marine diesel fuel to spill into the gulf.
“She had flooding in three distinct compartments,” Campbell said. “The flooding is secure, and the ship is making way on her own power.”
P-3 Orion aircraft flew over the area looking for a sheen of spilled oil, but “there’s no indication of that,” she said.
Hartford suffered “visible” damage to the sail and to a bow plane. Campbell could not say if components of the sail such as masts and periscopes are damaged.
“It’s important to point out that Hartford’s [nuclear] power plant was not affected in this at all,” she said. “We’ll be doing a full incident investigation report as well as a [Judge Advocate General’s Manual] investigation.”
This is third recent collision involving a U.S. submarine in the Strait of Hormuz or the Persian Gulf.
The attack submarine Newport News and the Japanese oil tanker Mogamigawa collided Jan. 8, 2007, in the Strait of Hormuz, a busy strategic chokepoint that runs between Iran and Oman. In that incident both ships were headed out of the gulf at night when the submerged submarine was overtaken by the faster-moving tanker sailing the same route.
The movement of the large tanker caused the smaller submarine to be drawn into the ship’s surface wake by the intermingling pressure areas created by their hull washes — a phenomenon known in physics as the Venturi effect.
In a previous incident the night of Sept. 25, 2005, the attack submarine Philadelphia, while traveling on the surface, collided with a Turkish cargo ship off the coast of Bahrain. No one was injured in the collision.
Both Philadelphia and Newport News underwent repairs in Bahrain before returning to their homeports.
Hartford and New Orleans are members of the Boxer Expeditionary Strike Group. Another ship from the group, the dock landing ship Comstock, was in the area at the time of the collision. Boxer remains in the Gulf of Aden on counterpiracy patrol. It and most of the other strike group departed San Diego on Jan. 8.
New Orleans is the second ship of its class to have a rough first deployment. The first ship, San Antonio, spent a month laid up in Bahrain following major leaking in its oil lubrication system that took nearly a month and cost about $1.4 million to repair.

[Yggdrasil]

Like I said before, people living in fear of punishment are only motivated to do a good enough job to not get in trouble. You can't be worried about trying to make it to the next paygrade, when in you're in a battle to keep the one you've got.

[JHART]

It's not surprising the Surface Navy finds itself with its back up against the wall and has elected to come out swinging. For many years the Surface Navy has been the dumping ground for officers who couldn't hack Flight School or the Submarine Force. Very few Naval Academy graduates ever chose the Surface Navy as their first choice upon commissioning. Most wanted to fly. Then there was that few who wanted submarines or the Marine Corps (what were they thinking!?). Anyway, you can only kick a dog so long before it will bite you. That's the culture that the Navy imbued in the Surface Navy. Many of its newest officers were sent there with the mindset that they had failed and were now joining a group of misfits. Ye old "Self Fulfilling Prophecy." Then the Navy decides (with Congress's help) that it can man ships with fewer Sailors since it has all this great new technology and it can also find manpower economies by merging like-occupational fields. Yeah that's it, we'll have fewer Sailors on ships and those that we do have will be required to learn and do the job that it previously took three Sailors from various fields. Well, that didn't work either. The Navy learned it did not have enough folks to clean the ship and do all the preservation and maintenance let alone operate and repair equipment at sea. Then the Fleet Review Boards cancelled a number of critical inspections that the Navy had relied on for years to keep its ships operating and in good condition. At the same time, the Navy laid out a career track for Surface Officers that would keep them at sea and away from their families for practically the first 10 years of service. Then (and the Navy had a lot of help on this one), we reduced the number of Surface ships and gave those remaining an OPTEMPO that would break even the most strongest Navy in modern times. Oh yeah, back-to-back deployments, extended deployments, and don't forget the requirement to pick up the Army's missions, too. So, is it any wonder why tempers are so shortfused out there; ships being tied up because they're not ready to steam; and Surface Officer retention in the toilet? Wake up Navy!

[Battleshort]

THINGS JUST GOT WORSE FOR THE SWO COMMUNITY.......
Hormuz collision has sub, amphib out of action


...and if it was the sub-drivers fault?

Easy junior - wait for the report.

[tmurphy]

Oh yeah, back-to-back deployments, extended deployments, and don't forget the requirement to pick up the Army's missions, too. AMEN Brother! I think you might have something here. I just got off back to back sea tours(8YEARS) and finally got to shore duty. Six months later, I was volun-told to go "boots on ground" I.A. Duty with the Army in the big sand box. I am just waiting for orders to Afghan next since you are required to do a GSA tour in between PCS moves and then back to the boat again. The best part is you don't even get to take the Navy wide exam in war zones.
You are also right about doing three different jobs. We merged with AK's a few years back and now this year we merging with PC's. What's next CS's and SH's?

[Variable Wind]

Hmmm, I do see some valid points here, but still I see a whole lot of whining too.

[tmurphy]

...and if it was the sub-drivers fault?

Easy junior - wait for the report.I wasn't pointing fingers at who is at fault but now that you mentioned it. The CO is still responsible--right?

[tmurphy]

Hmmm, I do see some valid points here, but still I see a whole lot of whining too.Come on, you know a B*$%$%-ING Sailor is a happy Sailor. Can I have some crackers with my wine?:rolleyes:

[Variable Wind]

Come you know a B*$%$%-ING Sailor is a happy Sailor. Can I have some crackers with my wine?:rolleyes:

HAHA!!! Very true, we say the same thing on my end. I will reiterate that the way the article was written, did not argue the case very well.

[MPLisa]

Sadly; I think we just witnessed another two CO billets open up: one in surface and one submarines.

Want to know an even greater tragedy, and evidence that this B.S. is pervasive through the executive ranks of Government? Read this:

Guess what Murtha has been given by the Navy!
Honored with Public Service Award, bloggers erupt in outrage

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Posted: March 19, 2009
11:58 pm Eastern

© 2009 WorldNetDaily


Rep. John Murtha, D-Pa.
The U.S. Navy awarded U.S. Rep. John Murtha, D-Pa., its Distinguished Public Service Award, triggering an Internet campaign to have Navy Secretary Donald C. Winter withdraw it.

Murtha, who publicly accused U.S. Marines of cold-blooded murder in a firefight in Haditha, Iraq, and was caught on camera in the Abscam scandal appearing to negotiate a bribe, was honored by the Navy for his "selfless devotion to the Nation's Sailors and Marines."

The award credits him with making sure the military services "were provided the resources necessary to effectively conduct the Global War on Terrorism."

"His courageous leadership, vision, and loyalty to the men and women of the Department of the Navy greatly contributed to their quality of life and helped create the most modern and highly trained fighting force in history," the honor said.

Through shocking behind-the-scenes stories, Sen. Tom Coburn documents what you already suspect – elected representatives put politics and their own reelection bids ahead of principles. "Breach of Trust" names names from both parties.

It continued, "As Chairman of Subcommittee on Defense of the House Appropriations Committee, Congressman Murtha's tireless advocacy helped maintain the Navy and Marine Corps team at the highest levels of combat readiness to meet the challenges of the 21st century."

An online petition that appeared almost immediately already has collected more than 11,500 signatures.

It was set up by Gabe Ledeen of VetsForFreedom.org.

[CDE]

As sure as I am sitting here the Navy will spin the minimally manned ship idea as a resounding success no matter how bad the evidence. One of the biggest problems is that "they" will not come to grips with what actually takes place on a ship. If a serious Lean Six-Sigma guru attempted to study the day-to-day processes on a ship (never mind the command climate) he/she would spontaneously combust from all the wasted movement and variability.

[TheReprobate]

The award given to Murtha is total bullsh*t.

What selfless action and leadership he displayed in sitting behind a desk and investigating the very Marines that are fighting his war.

[Yggdrasil]

As sure as I am sitting here the Navy will spin the minimally manned ship idea as a resounding success no matter how bad the evidence. One of the biggest problems is that "they" will not come to grips with what actually takes place on a ship. If a serious Lean Six-Sigma guru attempted to study the day-to-day processes on a ship (never mind the command climate) he/she would spontaneously combust from all the wasted movement and variability.

You what I love about the Navy sometimes? EVERY dumbfuck idea is a good one when you have an unlimited supply of man hours to support it, and the person with that idea is not going to be a victim of it. Gotta love it!

[snipe_cpo]

It all boils down to leadership, and the fact Officers don't have any skill or training in it.

[MPLisa]

Snipe - I disagree with your blanket statement. MANY officers DO have leadership experience, and lots of training in it. I was both enlisted (made CPO), AND an officer. Most of the mustangs I knew where great leaders. I can name a bunch who made it up to O-6 and command. There are non-mustang officers that I've met who were great leaders also.

It is the evaluation and promotion system that tends to breed out behaviors that would highlight leadership traits in these officers, that is, things like innovation, smal unit leadership (How many small-boat captains do you know that rose to flag rank??), risk-taking, etc. The system does require tons of education up to and including the Doctoral level (but do we need PhD's in Public Adminstration??)

Lots of superb officer leaders in our history, that, despite setbacks that would have sunk them today, the became great American heros: Nimitz - was court martialled!, Chesty Puller, Halsey, Mitscher, Spruance, Burke, Bulkley, Porter, Farragut, etc. etc. etc.

[hankman00]

I just had the pleasure of reading your article on SWO culture in the Navy Times. As a newly appointed Division Officer in the surface fleet I can say that your words ring true. I am a prior enlisted officer with 11 years in service, and I have been completely surprised by the SWO culture. Much of the accepted behavior in the wardroom seems contradictory to the classical examples of leadership we have all had the opportunity to learn. I was warned that SWOs eat their young, and it was a risk I was willing to take to achieve my goal of becoming a Naval Officer. I can only say that I had no idea what I was getting in to. I have never been treated this poorly--even as a seaman. In the SWO world, if you are not qualified you are of no worth to Department Heads and up. However, qualified officers are generally very reluctant to help an unqualified officer progress in the qualifi! ca! tion process. As long as they are qualified, and others are not, it gives them a certain power. Knowledge is power, and SWOs typically do no want to spread that power around. As the SWO culture currently exists, I cannot say that people of real quality want to remain in the SWO community. SWOs tend to share a certain uninspiring and curmudgeonly quality that is hard to put a finger on. Unfortunately, the increasing SWO bonuses only keep those around who are willing to forget about right and wrong for a small fortune. I would argue that a major paradigm shift in the SWO community would do more to create a culture that kept qualified officers than using bonuses as a band aid to keep morally questionable individuals.

I just wanted to drop you a line and thank you for writing an article that makes me feel less crazy and exposes, what I believe is, a damaging fault in the predominant Navy culture.

To those posting with comments about "sucking it up" and "sissies," I would offer that your limited and flawed thought patterns have helped sustain a terminally ill community. Statements like that have created the current community which is obviously broken. This thread is a place for people interested in legitimate and productive dialogue for change. I hope that we are beginning to see a change that will benefit us "sissies" and you hard cases as well.

[HAGHATER]

It is all true. Just to share some of my joys. I was asked to canx my wedding one week before after the underway was shifted up 3 days. This was a two week underway. I arranged with the carrier cod to fly to the ship to the day after my wedding and only miss three days. My dept head said I should just canx it since my marriage will not last and this was more important. My CO said it was my option to choose and she would not had the choice against me. So I go married met the ship a few days later and was black balled from the bridge since the CO "was not ready to forgive me for my actions" six months later according to the training officer when asking the CO to place me there for quals. Since I was a nuke and the CO had to explain it to a 4 star admiral why I was not qualified she then put me up there. So I finally got qualified OOD in OCT of that year, the the CO was being relieved in FEB. She refused to give me a SWO Board before she left. So I had to wait 4 months with the new CO.

Another great waste. If you have damaged equipment that can not be fixed because the parts are not there you are required to send an update once a month until the part comes. The part was on backorder and it would have been 2yrs before our ship could get it. So the update went out to say the some exact thing for 24 months. So this message had 24 varients since the XO and CO felt they had to change this every time to say the same thing with no new info. This would take 8 hours to route this message to send it off. It was my favorite day of the month.

This article and these events are why I dropped my letter and getting out.. and I still married over 6 yrs now!!

[CDE]

Speaking of message traffic...let's not even get into the insanely inefficient routing process [I'll save that for a later rant] but what about the amount of redundant information disseminated via messages, email reports, and even phone calls. Why not just have one central catch-all system resembling SORTS....SORTS on steroids. Ammo Admin, Fuel Oil and Water, EDVR, etc...all ships status information is in one place and the ship keeps it updated. I shouldn't have to email the DESRON SDO a completely separate spreadsheet with CASREP updates. Why do we bother addressing messages to the ISIC if we have to call and email them anyways. READ YOUR MESSAGE TRAFFIC AND DO YOU OWN STAFF WORK!!! Incompetent or undermanned staffs should not put the burden on the ships!!!!!!!!!!!! [excuse that tangent] As I was saying, we need an end to redundant reporting. I believe the folks at Toyota call this "muda."

[Yggdrasil]

It appears that submarine officers don't have it any better.

http://www.newnavy.us/naval-resignation-letter.htm

[ThisIsEasy]

People can be a negative impact in any organization; particular if that organization is one which has lost manning and money while demands on that orgnization have not changed. I've worked with a few rotten people during my 25 years of service, including over 14 years as a SWO; and I've worked with enough outstanding leaders that I know that the tantrum-tossing, flame-throwing leaders that unfortunately exist are the anomaly. Better yet, I've worked with officers and enlisted at all levels who know their jobs, learn quickly, take direction, maintain positive attitudes and deliver results despite the challenges the Surface Navy is faced with. To me, that's SWO Culture. (Thinking to self... What if I replaced the word "bully" with "competent officer" in the article?)

[CDE]

Define "anomaly." Based on my own limited experience plus conversations with many many many others - the percent of so-called "anomalies" is high enough to where about 3/4 of the ships out there have at least one "anomaly" DH, XO, or CO. One anomaly at this level on even say 1/4 of the ships is absolutely unsatisfactory. The data (SWO retention rate) would suggest the number of ships with these people is much higher than 1/4. Less than 50% of all SWOs for sure but greater than 10% and that's too many.

So while those types of officers may be in the minority, I offer that their existence is not "strange, unusual, or unique." Otherwise we would not be having this discussion.

[ThisIsEasy]

@ CDE - You're absolutely correct. Anomaly was a bad word choice on my part. I should have said that the tantrum-tossing, flame-throwing leaders that unfortunately exist are not the norm. "Bullies" are not as common as plain old poor leaders.

[CDE]

Further more, who thinks the potential SECNAV nominee is going to be the one to fix things? He's not SECNAV so maybe there is hope.

[FreedomFan]

This problem, and yes it is a problem, is not a question of what degree are the SWO community is failing its Sailors, but what to do about the fact that the SWO community is failing its Sailors. For several years now the enlisted leaders have tried very hard to solve problems without their superiors. Why? Because almost every SWO on the waterfront has the exact same attitude about the enlisted community. It goes something like this, "(Though I am no expert in your field) I know all about this situation from dealing with it from (enter last command name here) and we solved it (should read: It went away because a bigger problem came along and I didn't stay long enough to see the result of my decisions nor did I bother putting a better plan into motion due to me not wanting to make too much noise so close to my next promotion...etc) so you had better listen to me and do what I say. By the way I know the Department Head and/or Executive Officer is taking a hard line with us but I've talked to him/her and he/she understands our situation." I wonder what happens when you let this kind of thinking go on for too long?

The line "eating their young" is an understatement, and a righteously accurate one at that. Very few senior SWOs at any Command on the waterfront take the time to properly train their JOs, it's so much easier to push ALL responsibility on the Chiefs then blame them when the JOs fail. Let's not forget pushing the rest of the problems at any Command on the Chiefs, doing nothing about it but complain and attend more meetings with other senior SWOs reporting that everything within their control is being done. Meanwhile numbers are being twisted in every report at every level in senior leadership for the sole purpose of pushing the time for absolute failure to the last possible minute so that time can come AFTER those officers have left their Commands........meaning it wasn't their fault. They just hope they make it to a few "good" Commands where not much will be required of them and they can learn better ways to get around the system long enough to make it to retirement.

Don't get me wrong, not all SWOs fall into this category. Most of the very senior officers I've met know about the real problems plaguing the Surface Fleet (because once upon a time they were in the category I've described above) but now they are so tied up with red tape that their answers come slow and "progressive".......and most out of pity from their past experiences combined with the kind of pride that old men talk about when reliving their glory days that most of them never had.

Yes, I am disgruntled by the SWO community. Clearly I have not had great experiences with the Surface Fleet and I can say with all confidence that the best leaders on the waterfront don't exist in the wardroom, but in the Goat Locker. If the SWOs want to push all responsibility to the Chiefs they should at least give them the room and trust to carry out their solutions, while being honest with their superiors about the real status of their Sailors. The truth is that the Surface Fleet is crumbling at the feet of those senior officers "leading" their afloat Commands, and that is NOT the message heard in the wardroom........it's just the message heard everywhere else. If the SWOs want to continue beating their chests, then maybe they should start earning the reputation that the great leaders of their past gained, instead of riding their coat tails. Just admit the problem and begin doing what you continue to tell everyone under you to do? FIX IT!

[CDE]

Where you stand depends on where you sit and trust me when I say that JOs do not start their careers wanting to do the jobs of the chiefs. With that, the JOs that are perceived as "hot runners" are often the ones with the good chiefs. Whatever the wardroom-goat locker interactions are, I think they are symptoms of more fundamental problems. These problems are the pillars of the "cultural norms" that need to change and that doesn't just happen over night. If we had reduced-manned ships with 5 people the COs would find a way have 10 people on the bridge (20 during Sea & Anchor detail).

[Beanie]

Everyone, I've enjoyed reading your discussion concerning Dr. Horner's article and the SWO culture. It seems to me, however, that the solution is simple. If you don't like the culture, change it. The idea that you have to participate in this negative behavioral pattern or risk being ostracized or "black-balled" by the other members of your wardroom or command is a cop-out. This is, I think, what some of the other posters were trying to get at when they replied "Stop whining." Unfortunately, however, they didn't complete their thought. I think they meant, "Stop whining and do something about it." The solution to the pervasive negativity does not lie in some fleet-wide initiative. It lies, rather, in a personal decision by each member of the Surface Community to shift the paradigm. The change is going to come from within and it can happen at any level, any rank. It's like my father would always ask me when I complained to him, "Well... are you going to be a part of the problem or a part of the solution?" Decide to be a part of the solution. When confronted with negative leadership, do not pass it on to those beneath you. Rather, make a conscious decision to lead positively. In the "Confucian Analects," Confucius says, "For a man of humanity is one who, wishing to establish himself, helps others to establish themselves, and who, wishing to gain perception, helps others to gain perception. He is able to take himself as an example." Be an asset to your seniors, to your peers, and to those in your charge. Remember, this is the Naval Service.

We are people, not robots. An "established" culture or behavioral paradigm does not have to dictate or define a person's actions. Create your own culture.

[Firewoman]

Actually, bullying (aggressive behavior) is never a cohesive strategy or a moral builder. Bullying hurts moral as well as serves to enforce distrust, fear, non-cohesiveness, low work output, and generally a divided culture. You want a culture in the military (and in civilian workforce places) that inspires, energizes, creates ideas and where people respect each other. With all these positive attributes the unit (group, etc) can achieve and surpasses all goals.

Bullying others is a childs way to behave. The military is not for children - it is for grown adults - let's act like one. The behavior described above is also a symptom of personality disorder spread rampant within the military (and in the US workforce in general). The "survival of the fittest", "every man for himself" attitude of our society supports this culture and enables Narcissists (the most common personality disorder) (or sociopaths/psychopaths) to take full advantage of people around them and basically squash those under them while they kiss up. They generally do get ahead, are seen as ambitious by seniors, and get the job done. The problem is the way they do it and the destruction they leave around them. They do not care about others (no empathy) and only care about themselves (looking out for number one) - not the group.

[BigDeckDriver]

Good Leaders, Please.

[My background: SWOS, one extended tour as a SWO JO, and lateral x-fer to Aviation.]
A career on the sea is a punishing business, period. Sorry Firewoman, but there is an incredibly limited usefulness for empathy onboard ship in my opinion. :) I think most people would agree that there isn't room to empathetically let a Divo fail at his job when he's on the bridge, or in charge of Engineering equipment that will leave the ship dark and quiet in heavy seas if it fails, etc. I think SWO is one of those jobs where it's really painful to be an apprentice (i.e. JO), but pain is part of the process and that isn't going to change.
What I think can be improved is some of the needless pain, or "bullying" that goes beyond just holding a new guy/girl to the stringent standards. Another way to say this is that we just want Good Leaders! And that has been the Navy's goal since its inception. Good Leaders mentor and teach like civilized human beings, and they have the ability to break their foot off in someone's behind when it is necessary. It is a balance. I don't think a good Naval leader can be All Hugs All The Time.
I wish all the JO SWOs luck. I hope you identify the great and noble things about being a Naval Officer and strive to embody them, even if some of your senior officers are taking the low road and acting abusive. The great leaders are out there too. Find them, and learn from them.

[ThisIsEasy]

Where do old SWOs come from if they're being eaten when they're young? Maybe just the strong survive? Or more correctly, those that were more adaptable survived, as a Anthropology 101 professor stated to me years ago. I've found that SWOs who learn quickly and broaden their skils moved up and those SWOs who were not so adaptable moved on or out. I've worked for a jerk or two but I don't think it was as traumatizing as many responders seem to have experienced. I'll tell you that I'm less frustrated by my JOs that are smart and learn quickly and more frustrated by JOs that take a lot of supervision and repeated hand holding. Being a competent SWO is challenging in a profession that is very demanding. We're responsible for Sailors lives and millions of tax payer dollars. Not everyone was cut out to be a SWO. I'm still not buying the categorization of the SWO community as bullies. In the end you're talking about a very small percentage of leaders that exhibit this bullying behavior.

[CDE]

OK, how about we change the course of this thread and start brainstorming ideas? No jokes, no sarcasm, no cynicism.

- 360 Feedback: I know that formally recorded 360 Feedback will never make it but we can have a "formal informal" process. It doesn't go into your record but you get the feedback in some manner. The timing can be debated too. For example, a CO might get all his/her feedback from the crew after moving to next command. Too many people are simply not aware of their faults. COs are capable of recognizing quality feedback and can ignore the trash.

- Exit Polling: Take it seriously. I'm pretty sure the Navy keeps data on who gets out and why. Maybe we need to have a more robust exit survey that includes lateral transfers AND, this is the key, they Navy needs to do something other than throwing money at SWO and DH bonuses because money is not the problem.

.....someone please add to this list....

[COBRA]

After 23 years in the Navy I was stationed on 5 different ships with nearly 10 years sea time. On those 5 ships I had a total of 12 different COs. Of these a total of 3 were relieved for cause. I only had 2 good SWO COs and I outstanding Aviator. Of the 3 Aviators not one ever beliitled the wardroom and all had a tremendous amount of cameraderie. I had 3 maniaical COs who enjoyed nothing better than to abuse the wardroom with the XO and DHs following suit as it was "endorsed" by the CO. I observed Officers throwing bread at mess atttendants or giving EMI that consisted of having an E-6 walking around the train warning danger circle saying "ding a ling". COs throwing water glasses at the CMC or a chair at the CHENG. I relieved a DH who essentially had a nervous breakdown in front of me!

SWO leadership never impressed and in fact embarrassed me but acted as a driving force for me to reach Command in order to be an example for future generations. Unfortunatley I never got Command.....The bad news is that those Officers with the outrageous conduct have moved onto Command with a coupole just finishing up his major Command...Oh yeah feedback from Os on those ships verified that these Officers never changed their ways from the time they were introduced to the "SWO Culture" as an Ensign!

[dparker1976]

Cobra,
Wow. That floors me. I had posted on this much earlier. I had pretty good luck with COs (not perfect, but ok). My basic point was that I didn't see SW as a warrior culture. I always thought the culture was fatalistic and that combat and technical skills were not valued and sleep deprivation and staying on the ship instead of going home to your family in port were. If you listen to young Marine and especially Army officers from Iraq and Afghanastan, they look, act and talk like warriors. SWOs in my memory never talked like these kids do.

Sometimes I wonder if the SW culture is perpetuated by "beaten dog syndrome" like pit bulls are trained to fight by being treated cruely to teach them to be cruel. I was only active for 7 years but spent more on an NRF ship and saw the same thing. You've had a lot more experience and I'd be interested in your thoughts. Thank you for your service and good luck.