CommunityEditor
03-15-2009, 06:46 PM
I read with great interest the March 2 article “Surface standdown,” which outlined the challenges facing the surface fleet. Of note is that the current series of challenges led to a “safety standdown” — something that sounded eerily reminiscent of the “operational pause” ordered last April.
I was inclined to conclude that this standdown probably won’t work, either — meaning that it will not produce real, permanent changes. To order “all stop” is unusual for any organization of any size in any business. Doing so twice in one year may hint at the depth of the problems faced.
At about the same time Navy Times was reporting the series of mishaps that led to the recent standdown, I noticed that I was receiving an increasing number of letters and e-mails from former students now serving as surface warfare officers. Folks in my business enjoy hearing from former students as a means of keeping in touch with what’s happening operationally, as it provides a great means of fine-tuning what we teach in the classroom.
The typical recent query from these young officers goes something like this: “Why, Professor, is the leadership you teach and the leadership we learn not in line with what we’ve encountered in the fleet?”
One junior officer in Mayport, Fla., explained: “I typically get thrown off the bridge at least once during a watch by a senior officer in some sort of profanity-laced tirade. Most of the time I have no idea what I did to cause the explosion.”
Maybe there’s more to the recent calamities than “poor seamanship and weak navigation skills” — these being perhaps only indicators of more significant problems. Maybe there’s something more deeply wrong with the SWO culture — something that produces a dysfunctional command climate which erodes effectiveness, teamwork, cohesion and war-fighting skills.
I informally investigated the notion that SWO culture could be inherently dysfunctional. The term “culture” refers to a basic pattern of assumptions and behaviors learned by members of a group or organization as the proper way to think and behave, and includes a general sense of “how things work” in the group or organization. I contacted several SWO junior officers who had recently completed two or more sea tours, asking them two simple questions: “Does a SWO culture exist? And, if so, what is it?” My intent was to get an honest, no-kidding assessment from folks who would know.
A female O-4 select reported: “There’s definitely a SWO culture. Thrive off of getting as little sleep as humanly possible, think Aegis is the greatest thing to happen to the human race, make fun of the folks who ‘don’t get it,’ talk down about the non-watchstanding supply rates, and you’re ‘in.’ It’s a bit like high school. SWOs eat their young. You earn respect for ripping into people and just being generally ‘hard-core.’ ”
A male O-4 select reported: “SWOs eat their young. Your job: stay on the good side of the bullies, the feared and unrelenting senior officers on your ship. Avoid being on the receiving end of their wrath. I am ashamed to say that I contributed to this culture to avoid finding myself on the other side of the table. To deal with the bullies, you become a bully. And, if you survive, you wear your SWO pin ‘like a badge of honor.’ ”
These comments provide a classic illustration of in-groups and out-groups, and the enormous amount of wasted energy that goes into their formation and maintenance. Far from reinforcing the value prioritization of ship-shipmate-self, these groups create conflict, inhibit information flow, and have a negative effect on the good order and discipline of the unit.
In fairness, several SWOs reported highly contrasting cultures on their ships which produced inherently positive experiences. These SWOs report senior leaders who are “civilized, respectable, tactful, knowledgeable men” that were like father figures and teachers whom you cared more about letting down than fearing an impending eruption. However, these SWOs were quick to add that theirs was not the normal experience and not indicative of the dominant SWO culture. “My ship was an anomaly,” was a typical refrain.
Unscientific and anecdotal but nonetheless striking, the results would indicate that something is amiss. If the descriptions of the dominant SWO culture are accurate, then it’s no wonder ships are running aground, boats are colliding and sailors are being lost overboard.
Think about it: Verbal abuse. Public degradation. Sleep deprivation. Fear. Temperamental outbursts. High school antics. Bullying. These descriptors are more indicative of hazing rituals than meaningful combat training aspiring to build watch team cohesion and capable war-fighters.
It should be acknowledged that any thoughtful, contemplative leader understands that there are times when emotionally charged engagement and public denigrations might be necessary and appropriate. Purposefully wonton, reckless, replicated behaviors would qualify for such a response.
Another is when the unit commander conducts nonjudicial punishment. Conducting an open captain’s mast on a ship’s fo’c’sle in front of the entire crew might be an appropriate and effective opportunity to abase a sailor who has committed an egregious act or purposeful violation. Open mast not only adjudicates the offense, but also reinforces established professional standards of conduct in a way that heightens the interest of the crew. This right remains only with the unit commander and does not subsequently empower all supervisors to follow suit.
There is little doubt that permanent fixes will require deeper changes to the surface force. So, where can we look to provide insight as to how to proceed?
We can start by building a proper training environment — one in which specified and implied tasks are identified, the conditions under which the tasks must be accomplished are specified, and acceptable standards are published and enforced. And then we can train to standard, not to time. Fear and condescension are not part of this training package. The setting and enforcing of high standards are.
We would also be wise to heed the advice of Vice Adm. James Bond Stockdale, who argued that “all leadership must be based on goodwill.” During our time together at Stanford University, Stockdale was fond of the using the phrase “leadership is teachership,” and was quick to add that “every great leader I’ve known has been a great teacher, able to ... set the right moral, social, and motivational climate.” In “Stockdalean” terms, bullying was something in which the bad guys engaged.
We can also learn from Fleet Adm. Chester Nimitz, who presented an imperturbable manner and fatherly mien to his subordinates. Described as having an uncanny ability to properly delegate authority, Nimitz appreciated contrariness. He would undeniably agree with one aspect of the recent standdown message to the surface fleet, which suggests that “COs should be better trained to listen to their subordinates and to try to manage less.”
Finally, we would do well to awaken the spirit of the guidance offered by legendary naval officer John Paul Jones, whose “Qualifications of a Naval Officer” are particularly poignant and relevant to the current challenges facing the surface fleet:
“It is by no means enough that an officer of the Navy should be a capable mariner. He must be that, of course, but also a great deal more. He should be as well a gentleman of liberal education, refined manners, punctilious courtesy, and the nicest sense of personal honor.
“He should be the soul of tact, patience, justice, firmness, and charity. No meritorious act of a subordinate should escape his attention or be left to pass without its reward, even if the reward is only a word of approval. Conversely, he shouldn’t be blind to a single fault in any subordinate, though at the same time, he should be quick and unfailing to distinguish error from malice, thoughtlessness from incompetence, and well meant shortcoming from heedless or stupid blunder.”
Leaders who mentor not menace, develop not demean, challenge not castigate — Jones’ prescription may be the starting point for addressing the problems at hand.
Article: http://www.navytimes.com/news/2009/03/navy_horner_swoculture_031509/
Surface Standdown: http://www.navytimes.com/community/opinion/navy_editorial_fleet_030209/
I was inclined to conclude that this standdown probably won’t work, either — meaning that it will not produce real, permanent changes. To order “all stop” is unusual for any organization of any size in any business. Doing so twice in one year may hint at the depth of the problems faced.
At about the same time Navy Times was reporting the series of mishaps that led to the recent standdown, I noticed that I was receiving an increasing number of letters and e-mails from former students now serving as surface warfare officers. Folks in my business enjoy hearing from former students as a means of keeping in touch with what’s happening operationally, as it provides a great means of fine-tuning what we teach in the classroom.
The typical recent query from these young officers goes something like this: “Why, Professor, is the leadership you teach and the leadership we learn not in line with what we’ve encountered in the fleet?”
One junior officer in Mayport, Fla., explained: “I typically get thrown off the bridge at least once during a watch by a senior officer in some sort of profanity-laced tirade. Most of the time I have no idea what I did to cause the explosion.”
Maybe there’s more to the recent calamities than “poor seamanship and weak navigation skills” — these being perhaps only indicators of more significant problems. Maybe there’s something more deeply wrong with the SWO culture — something that produces a dysfunctional command climate which erodes effectiveness, teamwork, cohesion and war-fighting skills.
I informally investigated the notion that SWO culture could be inherently dysfunctional. The term “culture” refers to a basic pattern of assumptions and behaviors learned by members of a group or organization as the proper way to think and behave, and includes a general sense of “how things work” in the group or organization. I contacted several SWO junior officers who had recently completed two or more sea tours, asking them two simple questions: “Does a SWO culture exist? And, if so, what is it?” My intent was to get an honest, no-kidding assessment from folks who would know.
A female O-4 select reported: “There’s definitely a SWO culture. Thrive off of getting as little sleep as humanly possible, think Aegis is the greatest thing to happen to the human race, make fun of the folks who ‘don’t get it,’ talk down about the non-watchstanding supply rates, and you’re ‘in.’ It’s a bit like high school. SWOs eat their young. You earn respect for ripping into people and just being generally ‘hard-core.’ ”
A male O-4 select reported: “SWOs eat their young. Your job: stay on the good side of the bullies, the feared and unrelenting senior officers on your ship. Avoid being on the receiving end of their wrath. I am ashamed to say that I contributed to this culture to avoid finding myself on the other side of the table. To deal with the bullies, you become a bully. And, if you survive, you wear your SWO pin ‘like a badge of honor.’ ”
These comments provide a classic illustration of in-groups and out-groups, and the enormous amount of wasted energy that goes into their formation and maintenance. Far from reinforcing the value prioritization of ship-shipmate-self, these groups create conflict, inhibit information flow, and have a negative effect on the good order and discipline of the unit.
In fairness, several SWOs reported highly contrasting cultures on their ships which produced inherently positive experiences. These SWOs report senior leaders who are “civilized, respectable, tactful, knowledgeable men” that were like father figures and teachers whom you cared more about letting down than fearing an impending eruption. However, these SWOs were quick to add that theirs was not the normal experience and not indicative of the dominant SWO culture. “My ship was an anomaly,” was a typical refrain.
Unscientific and anecdotal but nonetheless striking, the results would indicate that something is amiss. If the descriptions of the dominant SWO culture are accurate, then it’s no wonder ships are running aground, boats are colliding and sailors are being lost overboard.
Think about it: Verbal abuse. Public degradation. Sleep deprivation. Fear. Temperamental outbursts. High school antics. Bullying. These descriptors are more indicative of hazing rituals than meaningful combat training aspiring to build watch team cohesion and capable war-fighters.
It should be acknowledged that any thoughtful, contemplative leader understands that there are times when emotionally charged engagement and public denigrations might be necessary and appropriate. Purposefully wonton, reckless, replicated behaviors would qualify for such a response.
Another is when the unit commander conducts nonjudicial punishment. Conducting an open captain’s mast on a ship’s fo’c’sle in front of the entire crew might be an appropriate and effective opportunity to abase a sailor who has committed an egregious act or purposeful violation. Open mast not only adjudicates the offense, but also reinforces established professional standards of conduct in a way that heightens the interest of the crew. This right remains only with the unit commander and does not subsequently empower all supervisors to follow suit.
There is little doubt that permanent fixes will require deeper changes to the surface force. So, where can we look to provide insight as to how to proceed?
We can start by building a proper training environment — one in which specified and implied tasks are identified, the conditions under which the tasks must be accomplished are specified, and acceptable standards are published and enforced. And then we can train to standard, not to time. Fear and condescension are not part of this training package. The setting and enforcing of high standards are.
We would also be wise to heed the advice of Vice Adm. James Bond Stockdale, who argued that “all leadership must be based on goodwill.” During our time together at Stanford University, Stockdale was fond of the using the phrase “leadership is teachership,” and was quick to add that “every great leader I’ve known has been a great teacher, able to ... set the right moral, social, and motivational climate.” In “Stockdalean” terms, bullying was something in which the bad guys engaged.
We can also learn from Fleet Adm. Chester Nimitz, who presented an imperturbable manner and fatherly mien to his subordinates. Described as having an uncanny ability to properly delegate authority, Nimitz appreciated contrariness. He would undeniably agree with one aspect of the recent standdown message to the surface fleet, which suggests that “COs should be better trained to listen to their subordinates and to try to manage less.”
Finally, we would do well to awaken the spirit of the guidance offered by legendary naval officer John Paul Jones, whose “Qualifications of a Naval Officer” are particularly poignant and relevant to the current challenges facing the surface fleet:
“It is by no means enough that an officer of the Navy should be a capable mariner. He must be that, of course, but also a great deal more. He should be as well a gentleman of liberal education, refined manners, punctilious courtesy, and the nicest sense of personal honor.
“He should be the soul of tact, patience, justice, firmness, and charity. No meritorious act of a subordinate should escape his attention or be left to pass without its reward, even if the reward is only a word of approval. Conversely, he shouldn’t be blind to a single fault in any subordinate, though at the same time, he should be quick and unfailing to distinguish error from malice, thoughtlessness from incompetence, and well meant shortcoming from heedless or stupid blunder.”
Leaders who mentor not menace, develop not demean, challenge not castigate — Jones’ prescription may be the starting point for addressing the problems at hand.
Article: http://www.navytimes.com/news/2009/03/navy_horner_swoculture_031509/
Surface Standdown: http://www.navytimes.com/community/opinion/navy_editorial_fleet_030209/