CommunityEditor
03-25-2009, 09:15 PM
The headline “Stressed to Death” in the Feb.2 edition of Army Times concerning the investigation into suicides among the Houston Recruiting Battalion speaks volumes about a continued poor leadership climate throughout many battalions in the U.S. Army Recruiting Command. This is not a new problem and has existed for many years in the command.
Part of the real problem is focused on the fact that the Army selects only the highest-quality officers for assignments to command positions at the company and battalion level. These officers come to the command with outstanding records of success and are placed in positions for which they have no experience. They are expected to produce from day one, despite the fact that many of them have never sold anything to anyone. If they fail in a USAREC assignment, chances are their career will hit a bump in the road, as well. That increases the leader’s stress level.
When times get tough and production falls, many commanders have no idea what to do. When things did not go well when commanding a rifle platoon, infantry company or even a combat battalion, the solution was more effort and more time applied, and the job would get done.
This is not so in the sales world. More time and more effort do not produce more recruits. Bringing substandard recruiters to battalion headquarters on Saturdays to sit in a classroom while someone lectures them on how to recruit isn’t the solution. And it makes it harder on soldiers’ family lives.
What produces more recruits is solid training of front-line recruiters in the basics of sales and selling. It also means solid sales management training for supervisors.
What these leaders should not do is try to manage production themselves. They simply do not have the background to do so. The job of production management should fall to the senior noncommissioned officer. Unfortunately, that’s not what usually happens. In many cases, the officer tries to do it alone and the NCO merely becomes a record keeper and disciplinarian.
In USAREC, the culture is and has been that if you are not producing enough enlistments, you’re not working hard or long enough. Many commanders at all levels feel there is only one way to produce leads for potential enlistees, and that is to work those long hours (as evidenced by the Houston Battalion policy of a standard 13-hour day, six days a week).
In my early years as a field recruiter, I can remember times when our battalion production was falling and I would receive a telephone call announcing, “We’re on hours from now until further notice, eight to eight (meaning 8 a.m. to 8 p.m. is in effect).”
The second problem has to do with leadership and existing USAREC policies that state each recruiter must produce on his or her own efforts and work in a specified territory. In the rest of the Army, if a soldier needs help, his/her buddies jump in and help.
When you get to USAREC, that is not the norm. In USAREC, each recruiter has a goal, and they must achieve it on their own. They literally take complete ownership of every recruit. When things get tough, my experience has been that the supervisors tend to tell their individual recruiters what to do, yet few will actually get in the car and ride along with the failing recruiter for several days to help coach them. Their “buddy” will seldom jump in and help out because they either have their own issues, or the USAREC rule of territorial integrity takes over and they are left to sink or swim on their own.
My credential to comment on this ongoing problem includes the fact that I served in every NCO leadership position within the command from station commander to command sergeant major of a recruiting brigade. I spent 17 years within USAREC in units throughout the country. My commanders and I during that period were in full agreement on leadership and management tactics that would get results. They commanded the organizations, and I managed production.
My theory was always that my recruiters knew how to do the job, so all I had to do was ask them to do it. I did not tell them how many calls, appointments or hours they had to devote to accomplishing their mission. I merely made sure they understood what their mission was and that if they needed help, it would be there for them.
When soldiers or recruiters had a bad month, the solution was not micromanagement. The solution was that we got in our vehicles, went out to spend some time with the individual recruiter, station commander or first sergeant, and used field coaching techniques to help them improve their performance.
The problem now is definitely one of leadership.
Article: http://www.armytimes.com/community/opinion/army_backtalk_recruiters_033009/
Part of the real problem is focused on the fact that the Army selects only the highest-quality officers for assignments to command positions at the company and battalion level. These officers come to the command with outstanding records of success and are placed in positions for which they have no experience. They are expected to produce from day one, despite the fact that many of them have never sold anything to anyone. If they fail in a USAREC assignment, chances are their career will hit a bump in the road, as well. That increases the leader’s stress level.
When times get tough and production falls, many commanders have no idea what to do. When things did not go well when commanding a rifle platoon, infantry company or even a combat battalion, the solution was more effort and more time applied, and the job would get done.
This is not so in the sales world. More time and more effort do not produce more recruits. Bringing substandard recruiters to battalion headquarters on Saturdays to sit in a classroom while someone lectures them on how to recruit isn’t the solution. And it makes it harder on soldiers’ family lives.
What produces more recruits is solid training of front-line recruiters in the basics of sales and selling. It also means solid sales management training for supervisors.
What these leaders should not do is try to manage production themselves. They simply do not have the background to do so. The job of production management should fall to the senior noncommissioned officer. Unfortunately, that’s not what usually happens. In many cases, the officer tries to do it alone and the NCO merely becomes a record keeper and disciplinarian.
In USAREC, the culture is and has been that if you are not producing enough enlistments, you’re not working hard or long enough. Many commanders at all levels feel there is only one way to produce leads for potential enlistees, and that is to work those long hours (as evidenced by the Houston Battalion policy of a standard 13-hour day, six days a week).
In my early years as a field recruiter, I can remember times when our battalion production was falling and I would receive a telephone call announcing, “We’re on hours from now until further notice, eight to eight (meaning 8 a.m. to 8 p.m. is in effect).”
The second problem has to do with leadership and existing USAREC policies that state each recruiter must produce on his or her own efforts and work in a specified territory. In the rest of the Army, if a soldier needs help, his/her buddies jump in and help.
When you get to USAREC, that is not the norm. In USAREC, each recruiter has a goal, and they must achieve it on their own. They literally take complete ownership of every recruit. When things get tough, my experience has been that the supervisors tend to tell their individual recruiters what to do, yet few will actually get in the car and ride along with the failing recruiter for several days to help coach them. Their “buddy” will seldom jump in and help out because they either have their own issues, or the USAREC rule of territorial integrity takes over and they are left to sink or swim on their own.
My credential to comment on this ongoing problem includes the fact that I served in every NCO leadership position within the command from station commander to command sergeant major of a recruiting brigade. I spent 17 years within USAREC in units throughout the country. My commanders and I during that period were in full agreement on leadership and management tactics that would get results. They commanded the organizations, and I managed production.
My theory was always that my recruiters knew how to do the job, so all I had to do was ask them to do it. I did not tell them how many calls, appointments or hours they had to devote to accomplishing their mission. I merely made sure they understood what their mission was and that if they needed help, it would be there for them.
When soldiers or recruiters had a bad month, the solution was not micromanagement. The solution was that we got in our vehicles, went out to spend some time with the individual recruiter, station commander or first sergeant, and used field coaching techniques to help them improve their performance.
The problem now is definitely one of leadership.
Article: http://www.armytimes.com/community/opinion/army_backtalk_recruiters_033009/