TomD
11-20-2009, 12:47 PM
I originally wrote this in March. It is meant to spark a conversion about how we are fighting the war. OPSEC was cleared by an S-2 at the time.
5) Problem: No night-time raids unless approved by O-6 or higher.
Discussion: This was a part of several control measures that were handed down to all units in Afghanistan. I am pretty sure I read in an FM somewhere that “Control measures are not intended to restrict the exercise of initiative. Each control measure should have a specific purpose that contributes to mission accomplishment. If a control measure fails the purpose test, leaders should not use it.” FM 7-8. In defense of this policy it was intended to reduce the amount of raids conducted before sunrise when most targets would be asleep. By not conducting operations at night, the command could reduce the loss of rapport with the locals as a result of dry holes. Unfortunately, this also reduces our chances of surprising the enemy and defeating early warning systems. This helps to even the playing field with the enemy and produces more dry holes. We would not want to be unsportsmanlike now would we?
Solution: Adapt a plan to regain rapport lost by raids conducted on bad intelligence. Find commanders able to make tough decisions. This will mean getting rid of zero defect promotion system, as there is not a way to guarantee a lack of mistakes.
6) Problem: Platoon/ODA and smaller element operations require O-5 approval, company-level operations require O-6, battalion-combined operations require an O-8 approval and so on.
Discussion: Even an ODA requires a LTC to approve a split-team presence patrol within small arms range of their own Fire Base (FB). How’s that for micromanagement and eliminating initiative? Take a look at the CONOP approval process. Considering a Special Forces (SF) captain is supposed to be able to handle a host-nation battalion-sized element in the field, this does not say a whole lot for how SF views the capabilities of their captains. In the end, the CONOP approval process does protect the battalion and higher commanders. It allows them to ensure nothing bad will happen, again a result of the zero-defect policy.
Solution: There are two possibilities. First put an O-5 in charge of every platoon, an O-6 as Company Commander, ODA Team Leader etc. I am betting this will be popular with SF field grades. The second option is to hire competent people to take charge of these elements. Set up lower ranking people called lieutenants to be in charge of platoons and a rank called captain to command companies and ODAs. These leaders would give operations orders to their respective subordinate units. (NOTE: I did not write CONOP.) As part of this OPORD they will include a part that tells what their intent is and what the subordinate unit’s mission is. They will then receive back briefs as necessary and supervise.
7) Problem: Operations take six hours or more to be approved. (QRF and MEDEVAC packages not included)
Discussion: The U.S. Army at war takes pride in ‘being inside the decision curve of the enemy.’ I remember missing the birthday party for the provincial Governor’s son in Afghanistan. The party took place 450 meters from the front gate of my FB. After having our ‘5W’ (type of CONOP designed for rapid approval) delayed for hours it was denied on the basis that we did not have at least two checkpoints on the route in addition to the start point and end point. These checkpoints had to be at least 250 meters apart despite the fact that our final destination was a mere 450 meters from our FB. After some ‘spirited’ emails involving math and two hours after the party was over we received approval to go to the party that was within grazing fire range from the FB. Needless to say some rapport was lost with the governor who had personally driven to the FB to invite us to the party. In addition, we got our butts chewed for not executing an approved CONOP. Meanwhile a patrol pulls out of a base in Iraq and 30 minutes later it receives small arms fire from a well-positioned enemy element that received early warning from observers near the FOB. Looks like we need to add ‘decision curves’ to our math class because the enemy is well within ours. Now imagine a cyber attack that only jams up the internet or eats email. So much for fighting the war during that deployment.
[NOTE: I promised to only use personally experienced events so I did not use the story about the ODA that had Bin Laden pinpointed during TORA BORA but had to wait for hours for approval to conduct the raid. For arguments sake lets say it was a dry hole to begin with. Can someone explain to me why it would take hours to approve an ODA to attempt to capture the most wanted man alive during an operation that was specifically executed to capture said most wanted man alive.]
Solution: See solution for problem 6.
8) Problem: No less than eight ‘Trigger Pullers’ are allowed on a mission or outside the wire.
Discussion: This is another ‘policy’ put in place that really does not meet the purpose or common sense test. Rumor has it that the ‘Policy’ was put in place after a two man sniper team was killed. Doctrine still states that scout sniper teams are two men, LRS teams are six men, and ODAs should be able to conduct split team (six men) ops. If we are not going to train as we fight then why train? Losing soldiers is never a good thing. Losing a war because you are unwilling to take casualties is not only worse, it will result in higher casualties and wasted sacrifice.
Solution: Either update our doctrine and MTOE or stop being risk averse.
9) Problem: Even if conducting reconnaissance operations, vehicles will be marked with reflective tape, VS-17 panels, unit frequency, and use IR strobes.
Discussion: How many times have we heard about the enemy’s top-notch early warning (EW) system? My three year old daughter could warn me if you tried to sneak up on me like that. If we’re going to put all of these requirements on the vehicles, why did we even paint the vehicles tan to begin with. The good thing is the enemy has NVGs so the strobes help to keep contact to a minimum unless they want to hit us. I fail to see where putting your communications channel in big numbers on the back of your vehicles constitutes being OPSEC-savvy. I have seen some units take off their 6” bumper numbers for OPSEC reasons. This way the enemy can not tell what unit you are in. That is, until the enemy sees 2’ tall numbers spelling out the communications channel written on the back of you vehicle. Since different units use different channels guess what other piece of info you gave the enemy. Now there is the argument that helicopters and airplanes can not distinguish friend from foe. For some reason they cannot tell that the large box-like HMMWV, MRAP, Bradley, Stryker, etc located in the same place as the BFT marker is friendly. There is also an argument for the comms channels on the back of vehicles that derives from a need to talk with ground units from the air despite every battle space having a common frequency that is supposed to be monitored. There are also supposed to be at least two BFTs per patrol. Let us pretend that US soldiers are driving you down a road that has a lot of IED activity. They can take one of two vehicles. Vehicle #1 is marked with all the above listed items and vehicle #2 is only painted desert tan. Illumination is at 25% and the enemy has one set of Russian NVGs and an EFP. Which vehicle do you want to take?
Solution: Buy the pilots that can not tell an MRAP from a Toyota Hilux some eyeglasses. Add BFTs to helicopters and airplanes. Set up a universal ‘Go to hell’ everything is broken SC PT freq for everyone to be able to use anywhere in theater. Train the GFC to call in air strikes so that they can control the aircraft and not get bombed. Maybe even put a preformatted call for fire format in the BFT so that less experienced soldiers can send the order. Develop a doctrine for following noise and light discipline as mush as possible. i.e. engine noise can not be helped but IR strobes and reflective tape will get you pinpointed.
10) Problem: Units can not conduct operations longer than 96 hours long.
Discussion: Why did we do a ten day patrol in Florida phase? I thought we trained as we fought. Did I miss something or did we unionize? A patrol or mission should be ‘out of the wire’ as long as necessary. Can you imagine fighting D-Day the way we fight now? In theory, the limited duration of operations helps maintain the troops. Have we gotten so used to 96 hour Banana Republic
wars that we cannot be more than 96 hours away from going to the MWR again. I will point out the purpose test again. One of the major shifts in tactics with the surge was getting people off the FOBs not trying to keep them there.
Solution: Conduct missions to standard not time. Conduct training that increases the endurance of our soldiers.
11) Problem: All dismounted operations to include reconnaissance operations will be compromised from the start.
Discussion: Fact: as soon as you pull out the gate or drive by a town the enemy starts keeping tabs on you. Translation: you are compromised. Another technique is to come in by helicopter. After all, they are harder to track. While in some cases it maybe possible to use this technique, truth is the enemy is almost always aware of helicopter landings. False insertions help by increasing the amount of possible sites thereby diluting the tracking capability of the enemy. There are only two ways to be inserted without the enemy knowing something is up from the start: falling from the sky and rising from the water. These will probably up the risk assessment a bit. If we use the COA idea I proposed and add the fact that now that small reconnaissance team is not starting out compromised then that will no longer be an issue.
Solution: Create schools that teach airborne and subsurface infiltration techniques. Create units that can use these techniques to defeat enemy EW.
Commanders unwilling to use these techniques should be removed from the chain of command for units capable of performing these techniques.
12) Problem: All operations to include dismounted operations will require the soldiers to carry no less than 60 lbs. of gear.
Discussion: A Taliban soldier once said ‘I move through the mountains caring a loaf of bread an AK-47 and two magazines. You chase me carrying tens of kilos of equipment. Why do you think you will catch me?’ This is another instance of a tool predicating reliance upon it. Several units have a rule about wearing every bit of the issued body armor 24/7. That is approximately 40 pounds and we still have not picked up a gun. This is also approximately 20 quarts of water. Why are we wearing a CQB uniform on a dismounted patrol in the mountains?
Solution: Make uniform wear a commander’s decision as part of the COA development.
13) Problem: Units are told to avoid areas where enemy contact has been made.
Discussion: There stood a Brigade CSM asking why a unit would want to go to an area that another unit “Got their asses handed to them.” While the unit did take a couple of WIA no soldiers on our side died. Now here is a CSM questioning a soldiers desire to go to an area now confirmed to have an enemy presence. I am glad no one said that to the 101st during the Battle of the Bulge
Solution: We need to get rid of leadership that is so scared of casualties that it does not want to go where the enemy is or we will start losing wars.
14) Problem: Not being able to conduct night-time operations or drive off road.
Discussion: Assets were sending a live feed of 17 Scania trucks coming from another country straight into a suspected enemy logistical area in Iraq. Sense the Infantry unit controlling the feed was not allowed interdict the intelligence was passed immediately to the battle space owner. The battle space owner decisively responded with. ‘We do not have anything that rolls at night.’ There went over 200 tons of supplies. Second example CF is to conduct a cordon of a village in support of an IA air assault. The IA was to land at dawn the cordon was to be in place 30 minutes prior. One of the tank drivers was asked why they were using the hardball instead of the dirt roads with less EW and why they were setting up their cordon almost six hour early; he responded we do not know how to drive off road or at night never mind both. Both these units were CAV units. I only mention that because this was not some 82nd soldier given a tank. It was a branch devoted to driving around a battle field.
Solution: I suggest we make a Mission Essential Tasks List (METL).
All units should be required to be able to perform the tasks on there list.
One example might be a vehicle borne unit’s ability to drive at night cross-country. All commanders should report their ability to perform the tasks on their list. Any commander found to falsify that report be relieved. We have captured several enemy truck drivers. We should turn as many of them as possible so that they can teach the U.S. Army how to drive our off road vehicle at night off road. After all they can drive convoys of Scania trucks at night off road without thermals, NVGs, and BFTs.
15) Problem: Not conducting Air Assaults within small arms range of an objective. Hot LZs are automatic aborts. Not conducting helicopter flight at night because it is too dangerous. Not conducting helicopter operations during the day because it is too dangerous
Discussion: I added these together because of similar solutions. Oddly enough I encountered this in the same theater during the same day by 2 different aviation units to go to the same PZ. Sadly enough it was for a CASEVAC.
Solution: Bring back the Vietnam-era pilots. Train soldiers and pilots to do thing like repel and fast rope onto an objective. Cross train with Colombian pilots. They frequently deliver soldiers into the jungle and land in hot LZs. Devote part of Paragraph 1 of the OPORD to enemy situation take measures to avoid specific threats.
General Marshall removed many general officers who moved up in the ranks in a peacetime Army just prior to the start of WWII. Right now, many of my peers, motivated company grade officers who have only known war are getting discouraged and leaving the Army in droves. Furthermore, Soldiers do not understand why they cannot simply seek and destroy the enemy. Soldiers are asking why they do not look like the soldier on the right hand side of the Infantry home page banner when on patrol. Soldiers are asking why the chain of command is so scared. If we do not organizationally rid ourselves of this scourge called risk aversion we will lose wars. It is time to bring back the Warrior Ethos in spirit instead of just in writing.
5) Problem: No night-time raids unless approved by O-6 or higher.
Discussion: This was a part of several control measures that were handed down to all units in Afghanistan. I am pretty sure I read in an FM somewhere that “Control measures are not intended to restrict the exercise of initiative. Each control measure should have a specific purpose that contributes to mission accomplishment. If a control measure fails the purpose test, leaders should not use it.” FM 7-8. In defense of this policy it was intended to reduce the amount of raids conducted before sunrise when most targets would be asleep. By not conducting operations at night, the command could reduce the loss of rapport with the locals as a result of dry holes. Unfortunately, this also reduces our chances of surprising the enemy and defeating early warning systems. This helps to even the playing field with the enemy and produces more dry holes. We would not want to be unsportsmanlike now would we?
Solution: Adapt a plan to regain rapport lost by raids conducted on bad intelligence. Find commanders able to make tough decisions. This will mean getting rid of zero defect promotion system, as there is not a way to guarantee a lack of mistakes.
6) Problem: Platoon/ODA and smaller element operations require O-5 approval, company-level operations require O-6, battalion-combined operations require an O-8 approval and so on.
Discussion: Even an ODA requires a LTC to approve a split-team presence patrol within small arms range of their own Fire Base (FB). How’s that for micromanagement and eliminating initiative? Take a look at the CONOP approval process. Considering a Special Forces (SF) captain is supposed to be able to handle a host-nation battalion-sized element in the field, this does not say a whole lot for how SF views the capabilities of their captains. In the end, the CONOP approval process does protect the battalion and higher commanders. It allows them to ensure nothing bad will happen, again a result of the zero-defect policy.
Solution: There are two possibilities. First put an O-5 in charge of every platoon, an O-6 as Company Commander, ODA Team Leader etc. I am betting this will be popular with SF field grades. The second option is to hire competent people to take charge of these elements. Set up lower ranking people called lieutenants to be in charge of platoons and a rank called captain to command companies and ODAs. These leaders would give operations orders to their respective subordinate units. (NOTE: I did not write CONOP.) As part of this OPORD they will include a part that tells what their intent is and what the subordinate unit’s mission is. They will then receive back briefs as necessary and supervise.
7) Problem: Operations take six hours or more to be approved. (QRF and MEDEVAC packages not included)
Discussion: The U.S. Army at war takes pride in ‘being inside the decision curve of the enemy.’ I remember missing the birthday party for the provincial Governor’s son in Afghanistan. The party took place 450 meters from the front gate of my FB. After having our ‘5W’ (type of CONOP designed for rapid approval) delayed for hours it was denied on the basis that we did not have at least two checkpoints on the route in addition to the start point and end point. These checkpoints had to be at least 250 meters apart despite the fact that our final destination was a mere 450 meters from our FB. After some ‘spirited’ emails involving math and two hours after the party was over we received approval to go to the party that was within grazing fire range from the FB. Needless to say some rapport was lost with the governor who had personally driven to the FB to invite us to the party. In addition, we got our butts chewed for not executing an approved CONOP. Meanwhile a patrol pulls out of a base in Iraq and 30 minutes later it receives small arms fire from a well-positioned enemy element that received early warning from observers near the FOB. Looks like we need to add ‘decision curves’ to our math class because the enemy is well within ours. Now imagine a cyber attack that only jams up the internet or eats email. So much for fighting the war during that deployment.
[NOTE: I promised to only use personally experienced events so I did not use the story about the ODA that had Bin Laden pinpointed during TORA BORA but had to wait for hours for approval to conduct the raid. For arguments sake lets say it was a dry hole to begin with. Can someone explain to me why it would take hours to approve an ODA to attempt to capture the most wanted man alive during an operation that was specifically executed to capture said most wanted man alive.]
Solution: See solution for problem 6.
8) Problem: No less than eight ‘Trigger Pullers’ are allowed on a mission or outside the wire.
Discussion: This is another ‘policy’ put in place that really does not meet the purpose or common sense test. Rumor has it that the ‘Policy’ was put in place after a two man sniper team was killed. Doctrine still states that scout sniper teams are two men, LRS teams are six men, and ODAs should be able to conduct split team (six men) ops. If we are not going to train as we fight then why train? Losing soldiers is never a good thing. Losing a war because you are unwilling to take casualties is not only worse, it will result in higher casualties and wasted sacrifice.
Solution: Either update our doctrine and MTOE or stop being risk averse.
9) Problem: Even if conducting reconnaissance operations, vehicles will be marked with reflective tape, VS-17 panels, unit frequency, and use IR strobes.
Discussion: How many times have we heard about the enemy’s top-notch early warning (EW) system? My three year old daughter could warn me if you tried to sneak up on me like that. If we’re going to put all of these requirements on the vehicles, why did we even paint the vehicles tan to begin with. The good thing is the enemy has NVGs so the strobes help to keep contact to a minimum unless they want to hit us. I fail to see where putting your communications channel in big numbers on the back of your vehicles constitutes being OPSEC-savvy. I have seen some units take off their 6” bumper numbers for OPSEC reasons. This way the enemy can not tell what unit you are in. That is, until the enemy sees 2’ tall numbers spelling out the communications channel written on the back of you vehicle. Since different units use different channels guess what other piece of info you gave the enemy. Now there is the argument that helicopters and airplanes can not distinguish friend from foe. For some reason they cannot tell that the large box-like HMMWV, MRAP, Bradley, Stryker, etc located in the same place as the BFT marker is friendly. There is also an argument for the comms channels on the back of vehicles that derives from a need to talk with ground units from the air despite every battle space having a common frequency that is supposed to be monitored. There are also supposed to be at least two BFTs per patrol. Let us pretend that US soldiers are driving you down a road that has a lot of IED activity. They can take one of two vehicles. Vehicle #1 is marked with all the above listed items and vehicle #2 is only painted desert tan. Illumination is at 25% and the enemy has one set of Russian NVGs and an EFP. Which vehicle do you want to take?
Solution: Buy the pilots that can not tell an MRAP from a Toyota Hilux some eyeglasses. Add BFTs to helicopters and airplanes. Set up a universal ‘Go to hell’ everything is broken SC PT freq for everyone to be able to use anywhere in theater. Train the GFC to call in air strikes so that they can control the aircraft and not get bombed. Maybe even put a preformatted call for fire format in the BFT so that less experienced soldiers can send the order. Develop a doctrine for following noise and light discipline as mush as possible. i.e. engine noise can not be helped but IR strobes and reflective tape will get you pinpointed.
10) Problem: Units can not conduct operations longer than 96 hours long.
Discussion: Why did we do a ten day patrol in Florida phase? I thought we trained as we fought. Did I miss something or did we unionize? A patrol or mission should be ‘out of the wire’ as long as necessary. Can you imagine fighting D-Day the way we fight now? In theory, the limited duration of operations helps maintain the troops. Have we gotten so used to 96 hour Banana Republic
wars that we cannot be more than 96 hours away from going to the MWR again. I will point out the purpose test again. One of the major shifts in tactics with the surge was getting people off the FOBs not trying to keep them there.
Solution: Conduct missions to standard not time. Conduct training that increases the endurance of our soldiers.
11) Problem: All dismounted operations to include reconnaissance operations will be compromised from the start.
Discussion: Fact: as soon as you pull out the gate or drive by a town the enemy starts keeping tabs on you. Translation: you are compromised. Another technique is to come in by helicopter. After all, they are harder to track. While in some cases it maybe possible to use this technique, truth is the enemy is almost always aware of helicopter landings. False insertions help by increasing the amount of possible sites thereby diluting the tracking capability of the enemy. There are only two ways to be inserted without the enemy knowing something is up from the start: falling from the sky and rising from the water. These will probably up the risk assessment a bit. If we use the COA idea I proposed and add the fact that now that small reconnaissance team is not starting out compromised then that will no longer be an issue.
Solution: Create schools that teach airborne and subsurface infiltration techniques. Create units that can use these techniques to defeat enemy EW.
Commanders unwilling to use these techniques should be removed from the chain of command for units capable of performing these techniques.
12) Problem: All operations to include dismounted operations will require the soldiers to carry no less than 60 lbs. of gear.
Discussion: A Taliban soldier once said ‘I move through the mountains caring a loaf of bread an AK-47 and two magazines. You chase me carrying tens of kilos of equipment. Why do you think you will catch me?’ This is another instance of a tool predicating reliance upon it. Several units have a rule about wearing every bit of the issued body armor 24/7. That is approximately 40 pounds and we still have not picked up a gun. This is also approximately 20 quarts of water. Why are we wearing a CQB uniform on a dismounted patrol in the mountains?
Solution: Make uniform wear a commander’s decision as part of the COA development.
13) Problem: Units are told to avoid areas where enemy contact has been made.
Discussion: There stood a Brigade CSM asking why a unit would want to go to an area that another unit “Got their asses handed to them.” While the unit did take a couple of WIA no soldiers on our side died. Now here is a CSM questioning a soldiers desire to go to an area now confirmed to have an enemy presence. I am glad no one said that to the 101st during the Battle of the Bulge
Solution: We need to get rid of leadership that is so scared of casualties that it does not want to go where the enemy is or we will start losing wars.
14) Problem: Not being able to conduct night-time operations or drive off road.
Discussion: Assets were sending a live feed of 17 Scania trucks coming from another country straight into a suspected enemy logistical area in Iraq. Sense the Infantry unit controlling the feed was not allowed interdict the intelligence was passed immediately to the battle space owner. The battle space owner decisively responded with. ‘We do not have anything that rolls at night.’ There went over 200 tons of supplies. Second example CF is to conduct a cordon of a village in support of an IA air assault. The IA was to land at dawn the cordon was to be in place 30 minutes prior. One of the tank drivers was asked why they were using the hardball instead of the dirt roads with less EW and why they were setting up their cordon almost six hour early; he responded we do not know how to drive off road or at night never mind both. Both these units were CAV units. I only mention that because this was not some 82nd soldier given a tank. It was a branch devoted to driving around a battle field.
Solution: I suggest we make a Mission Essential Tasks List (METL).
All units should be required to be able to perform the tasks on there list.
One example might be a vehicle borne unit’s ability to drive at night cross-country. All commanders should report their ability to perform the tasks on their list. Any commander found to falsify that report be relieved. We have captured several enemy truck drivers. We should turn as many of them as possible so that they can teach the U.S. Army how to drive our off road vehicle at night off road. After all they can drive convoys of Scania trucks at night off road without thermals, NVGs, and BFTs.
15) Problem: Not conducting Air Assaults within small arms range of an objective. Hot LZs are automatic aborts. Not conducting helicopter flight at night because it is too dangerous. Not conducting helicopter operations during the day because it is too dangerous
Discussion: I added these together because of similar solutions. Oddly enough I encountered this in the same theater during the same day by 2 different aviation units to go to the same PZ. Sadly enough it was for a CASEVAC.
Solution: Bring back the Vietnam-era pilots. Train soldiers and pilots to do thing like repel and fast rope onto an objective. Cross train with Colombian pilots. They frequently deliver soldiers into the jungle and land in hot LZs. Devote part of Paragraph 1 of the OPORD to enemy situation take measures to avoid specific threats.
General Marshall removed many general officers who moved up in the ranks in a peacetime Army just prior to the start of WWII. Right now, many of my peers, motivated company grade officers who have only known war are getting discouraged and leaving the Army in droves. Furthermore, Soldiers do not understand why they cannot simply seek and destroy the enemy. Soldiers are asking why they do not look like the soldier on the right hand side of the Infantry home page banner when on patrol. Soldiers are asking why the chain of command is so scared. If we do not organizationally rid ourselves of this scourge called risk aversion we will lose wars. It is time to bring back the Warrior Ethos in spirit instead of just in writing.