Backtalk: Ignoring past lessons

[CommunityEditor]

Return to inferior organizational structure makes little sense
By Kenneth O. Lynn


The decision to align aircraft maintenance units into fighter, bomber and combat search-and-rescue flying squadrons by November ignores lessons of history and experience.

The Air Force has operated under five wing organizational structures for operations and maintenance/logistics.

Initially, from 1947 to 1962, wings included an operations and logistics group, with sortie-generating maintainers assigned to flying squadrons and all others assigned to logistics groups. The results: low aircraft mission-capable rates, low flying time for aircrews, problems managing shared wing resources and no single overseer to manage aircraft fleet health.

From 1962 to 1978, wing organization centralized around “job control.” Maintainers were assigned to logistics or maintenance groups, but were organized by functions, with any maintainer working any aircraft and any pilot flying any aircraft. Initially a success, this structure eventually resulted in low mission-capable and flying-utilization rates.

This all changed in 1978, when Gen. Bill Creech took over Tactical Air Command. With a deep belief in the operations/maintenance team concept, and an understanding that people take better care of things that “belong to them,” wing organization returned to what were essentially operations and maintenance groups.

Sortie-generating maintainers were divided into aircraft maintenance units and were co-located with and dedicated to supporting a particular flying squadron. Backshop maintainers were assigned to functional squadrons within the maintenance organization, but, where possible, the dedicated team concept was extended within these units. This resulted in about 90 percent of the deploying aviation package working together on a daily basis.

The success was staggering: Mission-capable and utilization rates skyrocketed, aircrew proficiency greatly improved, annual flying programs were routinely completed “early,” and a single maintenance group commander could oversee shared wing resources, with responsibility and authority to focus on fleet health. The triumphant prosecution of Desert Shield/Storm under this structure showed its true worth.

Despite this success, a decision was made in February 1991 to adopt a new wing structure, the “objective wing,” which mimicked the operations and logistics groups of 1947. Predictably, mission-capable rates and aircraft fleet health deteriorated, effective aircrew training became more difficult and lack of standardization became the norm.

In 2002, the new “combat wing organization” re-established maintenance groups and placed all maintainers within them. With a single group commander invested with the responsibility to oversee fleet health, manage shared wing resources, standardize maintenance practices and ensure the ops/maintenance team concept was retained, the results have been unsurprising. Mission-capable, utilization, aircrew proficiency and aircraft availability rates have all greatly improved.

So we’re now going to return to an organizational structure that has twice shown it is inferior to the current structure?

The fatal oversight in Chief of Staff Gen. T. Michael Moseley’s directive is the notion that somehow sortie-generating maintainers are not in the “operations” chain of command, but that maintenance squadrons and groups all report to the wing commander.

Flying and fixing are complicated things. Having a flying squadron commander responsible for both flying and maintaining creates a span of control that’s too large.

At a time when our Air Force is waging two wars, has the oldest average aircraft inventory in its history, and has an organizational structure that is tailor-made for operating in an expeditionary environment, it makes little sense to turn back to a structure proven to be less productive.


Article: http://www.militarytimes.com/communi...essons_060908/

[Wingman Leader Warrior]

This article reflects the ends...and very specific ones...aircraft availability/mission capable rates.

Our current military and civilian leadership has grown up learning from past errors that ends are not the only measure of success or failure...how you get there and what it costs it time, people and money is just as if not more important. We're talking second and third order effects in a resource constrained environment.

What about officer and enlisted career development? What about the transparency of translating home-station to deployed organization in which the detachment commander is the commander of the deployed maintenance and operations personnel--why organize differently deployed than at home? If deployed operations are why we train and exist, shouldn't they drive the organizational model...and if doctrine states unity of command, why would you have a separate maintenance commander and operations commander to generate air power to fight on an ATO cycle?

There's a cultural issue behind this that is unaddressed. Maintenance officers get the short straw under the new organization...they're placed under operators and not many people in the Air Force have ever enjoyed that. You know who does? Crew chiefs....at least the ones I've talked to...they LOVE IT!!! Because between operators and maintainers, operators treat them better. So if the supervisors and OICs don't like the organization, is it going to succeed? Nope. We've got a cultural barrier to what could otherwise be a very successful organizational construct. Translation: good means, ways and ends.

No one will be able to fix that cultural problem without directly engaging the people who have to support it...the maintainers...officers and enlisted. You need buy-in...they have to have a culture that they support and that supports them. Bouncing back and forth every seven to ten years will prevent that from ever happening.

[Wingman Leader Warrior]

Subsequent to my first post, it has been suggested to me that operators don't care about maintainence. Since the Air Force alone has multiple types of aircraft at dozens of Air Force bases with vastly different organizations, histories, heritages, training..., I don't think it's reasonable for someone to make a blanket statement about all operators or all maintenance. If I have done that, then I apologize...unless supported by facts, my assertions are the result of my direct experiences or discussions with people related to the issue...and I'll do my best to qualify those statements (e.g. "...at least the ones I've talked to...").

If it is the case that you as a maintainer or operator do not have a good relationship with the other at your unit, well...this is part of the very cultural problem I am pointing to. You can tell me if they're legitimate or not but I'll make one resentful statement from each side just to illustrate. I'm pretty certain it's a cultural issue.

Operator: maintenance drags their feet, is disorganized, doesn't understand I need to take off right now, says it takes longer to fix something than it does, won't work with me to make the schedule happen...

Maintainer: operators don't care about the aircraft, don't even know my name, don't appreciate how hard I work, are cocky, don't understand what it takes to keep the jet flying, just fly and drink, don't have to do real work...

[Calmo70]

What truly needs to happen is what use to be a standard course of action for pilots. After flying for four to eight years, pilots were given assignments in logistics related career fields (maintenance, ammo, supply, trans, etc.) This gave them a better perspective on the entire effort required to put a plane in the air.

I had the priviledge of "educating" several flyers in that regard. Two eventually became general officers and upon my retirement from the Air Force in 1998 sent warm regards to me as to their experiences with me as an logistics/transportation NCO showing me, in their words "the true meaning of a total force".

As a transporter - the motto is "Nothing happens until something moves". We make that happen - getting spare parts, ammo, and all other equipment/supplies at the point they were needed. Granted we are limited as far as availability of transportation modes - but we always move stuff as fast as possible.

Not to get off subject - but in the AOR we could get stuff in the country faster than you could imagine. But, to get it our possession dealing with host county customs (Turkey, Oman, UAE, Saudi, etc) is like dealing with the worst bureaucracy ever imagined.

[Wingman Leader Warrior]

Amen to that! You've provided an example of how to influence building a culture that breaks down those barriers of misunderstanding and misattribution between operators and maintainers...education! If our leadership doesn't know how to do it, our youngest officers and enlisted members will find it all the more difficult.

Why wait that long for the officers? Why not make an accelerated maintenance officer course required education for operators? It could be part of the pipeline training after nav and pilot training. It could be taught at the first operational assignment base using a common Air Force curriculum with first-hand experience tailored to the base-specific line. Some flying squadrons have this as part of their in-processing checklist but don't take it seriously...it's only what the operator makes out of it and the maintainers are usually too busy to participate...which is understandable when it isn't scheduled but just done ad hoc.

Similarly, maintenance supervisors should afford their people the opportunity to visit with operations and see what goes on. But who wants to swing by at the end of a 12-hour shift to talk about work? There is a misunderstanding on both sides of what the other does.

Finally, I'm all about chest-thumping...I think it's great for morale...but it should be in the vein of exactly what you've said: we could do our job really well. It's not productive to say "without me you can't do anything;" because everyone knows that the truth is every process and person is necessary to accomplishment of the mission...if you're not, it's time to cut you loose...you're dead weight. From the CDC worker to the finance employee to the crew chief to the guy/gal who pushes the release button...these are all essential to take care of the people who accomplish the mission...no people, no mission.

[Hero]

Amen to that WLW!

We can rebuild the "trust culture" in our Air Force.

[ramprat]

i spent over twenty years on the flightline ,f80,kb29,b29,b47,rb47 tran maint ncoic,c141.
i was convinced that if every aricraft on the base disappeared one night ,the rest of the
base wouldnt notice it for at least six weeks.
went over twenty for assignment as ftd instructor,my first inside job.