The Army has continued a holiday tradition of the past five years by again not authorizing early outs during the Christmas and New Year holidays.

Sources said the decision to cancel the 2009 Holiday Early Transition Program was not a difficult one given the press of deployments, and the manning and resetting of units.

Up until 2004, the Army usually authorized the phased, early release of soldiers whose service obligations expired during the final weeks of the year, when most installations, units and training centers experience an exodus of soldiers and families going home for the holidays.

“The Holiday Early Transition Program is cancelled until further notice,” according to a notice recently sent to field commands. “Current separation and out-processing procedures for soldiers remain in effect.”


Article: http://www.militarytimes.com/news/20...liday_112009w/

About a year ago in northwestern Iraq, I was sitting in the operations center (OPCEN) awaiting my approval letter to conduct a simple ISF interaction mission. It was a familiar sight: HMMWVs were outside idling, my Soldiers either hanging around or sleeping on top of whatever could be found. I was sitting there and not patrolling despite having sent my concept of operation (CONOP) for approval 14 hours prior to the mission start time. This wasn’t the first instance that I was waiting for a decision to be made an hour before launch time. Even though my company commander was just down the hall, he couldn’t help as it took no less than a LTC’s signature to approve even the most mundane of missions. 50 minutes from SP the CONOP was approved without changes.
On my way to my HMMWV, I thought back to a day about two years prior. On that day I was in Colombia assisting their commandos with a mission into an area that had been designated as a ‘RED ZONE’. A commando battalion sent in the previous day had been compromised and was still in contact with FARC elements. In less than twelve hours total, a decision to conduct a nighttime battalion-size Air Assault (AA) into a hot LZ was made, and the operation was planned for, rehearsed, and executed. The lift element consisted of two UH-60 gunships and four UH-60s. The opportunity to conduct casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) was also taken advantage of. A second world country had done in twelve hours what we the U.S. Army is seemingly incapable of due to one primary factor-- our risk aversion.
I bring up the previous two anecdotes to make a point-- that the same mission conducted by the Colombian commando battalion would have been nearly impossible for the U.S. Army to execute. There is also a lack of trust in the judgment of junior leaders. A cursory examination of the CONOP process reveals that a brigade commander is not authorized to tell his battalions to do a mission. Every single CONOP process I have been witness to has a division commander as the approval authority for battalion-size operations. I believe we are a part of the most technologically advanced and simultaneously risk averse military in the world.
Today’s Army is extremely risk averse so much so that it is impeding our ability to properly conduct the Global War on Terrorism. Part of this is due to years of peace time leadership that eventually produced the ‘Zero- Defect’ promotion system. Promotions were based on an impossible model of perfection which led to the development of an extreme operational conservatism. If your battle space gets more violent but you do not have an Abu Ghraib-type incident then you get a Bronze Star Medal and a promotion. If you take chances, think outside of the box and make decisions rapidly you have a higher probability of making a questionable decision. As a result, commanders are conservative and maximize their ability to minimize risk, following the example of their superiors and passing on such risk aversion to their subordinates.
The counterargument is that the Army is actually not risk averse. We can debunk this with a short discussion. What is the leading cause of American combat casualties in Iraq? There have been over 1,700 deaths from IEDs alone. Even taking into account non-combat injuries in Iraq (<900), there have been 800 more deaths from just IEDs. (Feb 09) Now go to the AKO home page and look for IED-related topics. Having difficulty finding it? While there is a whole tab on the front page of AKO devoted to risk and avoiding it, if you want information on IEDs you have to go near the mid-bottom of the page. There you will find a link to other links. For example, listed after the My Clothing and Eagle Cash links is the IED-D link. Now either look around or think back to your FOB. How many posters and signs are/were there telling soldiers to be safe, do not speed, do not take risks, etc? How many showed you how to identify or avoid an IED, signs of an ambush, or how to conduct SSE? What if we had told the soldiers on D-day not to take any risks and played it safe?
What follows is a discussion on some policies that I have personally encountered and believe hinder our ability to prosecute the GWOT, utilizing the familiar problem, discussion, solution format. Some solutions are equipment upgrades or training focuses that will increase the effectiveness of our forces. I will limit pointing out which units or branches had these ‘policies’ in place as they are being presented to demonstrate how risk aversion is limiting our effects on the enemy, not to chastise specifics units or people.

1) Problem: Orders from higher directing combat arms units not to attack interdict or make contact with the enemy.

Discussion: I encountered one order that specifically stated ‘[element] is to take all measures to avoid contact or association with enemy elements’. Considering the mission was to go find the enemy, the order presented a dilemma. These orders specifically included a prohibition against interdiction of actionable targets or enemy movements detected by other assets including ISR. The premise of this order was based on the assumption that other units would action these targets once located. The battle space owning unit usually refused to do so. As a result no one actioned these targets. The elements higher command was repeatedly asked to action those targets by both the battle space owner and the company level leadership. This is a classic case of risk aversion. If the unit did nothing but report then nothing but the report can be wrong. The effects of this risk aversion are not directly traceable, however there is a good argument that extra flags have been given to family members as a result of enemy elements not acted upon.

Solution: Any command that does not take every opportunity to kill capture the enemy when proper intelligence is provided should be removed immediately.
Never place combat arms units under the command or influence of non-combat arms units to include ADCON.

2) Problem: All operations/movements stop or are cancelled if weather hinders MEDEVAC by helicopter.

Discussion: I did a quick daily historical weather search for Fort Bragg in May ’08. There were approximately eleven inclement weather days. That is roughly 33% of the month. Due to these factors, ground units can only conduct operations when supporting MEDEVAC launch sites have VFR conditions. For those that think it is unthinkable to conduct military operations under MEDEVAC status red conditions, I point out that every war prior to Korea was conducted completely under what today would be classified as MEDEVAC ‘BLACK’ status. The existence of a tool should not predicate reliance upon that tool. Having been an 18D I understand the desire to always be able to call in for a MEDEVAC. However, every bad or marginal weather day that units do not maneuver grants the enemy freedom of maneuver for that period of time.

Solution: Train and equip the medics to be able to stabilize their patients for the expected ground MEDEVAC time from the furthest point in the battle space. Usually this is not more than a couple of hours. Give more training to MEDEVAC pilots in order for them to comfortably operate on instruments-only. Have these same pilots cross train with Coast Guard helicopter pilots who routinely conduct inclement weather rescues. Add a doctor, medic or if possible 18D to the FOB QRF package. This would allow operations to occur in MEDEVAC red status and only stop any non-essential operations i.e. transporting soda and bread up MSR Tampa.

3) Problem: No air assault operations can be conducted during periods of ‘low’ illumination.

Discussion: May 2008 had several nights of ‘low’ illumination. Once we add in MEDEVAC status requirements it is a wonder that the U.S. Army can maneuver at all. This is a problem that needs to be resolved before we get involved in combat outside of a desert region.

Solution: Utilize IR landing lights and IR pyrotechnical devices. Pilots can use their PVS-15s. Conduct night training starting at Ft. Rucker. This training should gradually decrease the amount of illumination to the point where the pilots are dependent on active devices. Design a computer program to aid in LZ familiarization. This program needs to be able to calculate slope, visibility, and display 3D pictures of potential LZs. Utilize reconnaissance aircraft or ISR assets that can take detailed photos of proposed LZs.

4) Problem: Due to risk assessment requirements, currently, upon receiving a mission a junior leader has to have their commander ask a higher ranking officer if they are even authorized to do the mission.

Discussion: You are a company commander. You tell 1st Platoon go conduct a presence patrol in NAI 100. The 1st Platoon PL does a risk assessment. The PL decides that this is a ‘HIGH’ risk operation so now the PL sends the risk assessment to the first O-6 in the chain of command. Now the O-6 decides whether or not the mission you gave the PL was too risky. While this risk assessment is considered for approval/disapproval, on the other side of the world, we are fighting an enemy that will steal a fishing boat to use as a mother ship, infiltrate ten men by rubber boat to conduct several simultaneous raids, with no QRF, no air support, no body armor, and MEDEVAC status black.

Solution: I propose building in a default risk assessment into the planning process. As part of their planning every leader should come up with 3 courses of action (COA). The leader will then sit down and figure out which of the COAs is most likely to achieve mission success. Now the junior leaders are no longer asking their boss’s boss or boss’s boss’s boss if they actually have to do what they have been ordered to do. Not only that but they now actually evaluate the situation and figure out the best way and by default safest way to achieve mission success. NOTE: This will also force junior leaders to do something other than copy and paste a risk assessment. It will also force leaders to stop pretending that a CONOP replaces an OPORD.

I originally wrote this in March. It is meant to spark a conversion about how we are fighting the war. OPSEC was cleared by an S-2 at the time.

5) Problem: No night-time raids unless approved by O-6 or higher.

Discussion: This was a part of several control measures that were handed down to all units in Afghanistan. I am pretty sure I read in an FM somewhere that “Control measures are not intended to restrict the exercise of initiative. Each control measure should have a specific purpose that contributes to mission accomplishment. If a control measure fails the purpose test, leaders should not use it.” FM 7-8. In defense of this policy it was intended to reduce the amount of raids conducted before sunrise when most targets would be asleep. By not conducting operations at night, the command could reduce the loss of rapport with the locals as a result of dry holes. Unfortunately, this also reduces our chances of surprising the enemy and defeating early warning systems. This helps to even the playing field with the enemy and produces more dry holes. We would not want to be unsportsmanlike now would we?

Solution: Adapt a plan to regain rapport lost by raids conducted on bad intelligence. Find commanders able to make tough decisions. This will mean getting rid of zero defect promotion system, as there is not a way to guarantee a lack of mistakes.

6) Problem: Platoon/ODA and smaller element operations require O-5 approval, company-level operations require O-6, battalion-combined operations require an O-8 approval and so on.

Discussion: Even an ODA requires a LTC to approve a split-team presence patrol within small arms range of their own Fire Base (FB). How’s that for micromanagement and eliminating initiative? Take a look at the CONOP approval process. Considering a Special Forces (SF) captain is supposed to be able to handle a host-nation battalion-sized element in the field, this does not say a whole lot for how SF views the capabilities of their captains. In the end, the CONOP approval process does protect the battalion and higher commanders. It allows them to ensure nothing bad will happen, again a result of the zero-defect policy.

Solution: There are two possibilities. First put an O-5 in charge of every platoon, an O-6 as Company Commander, ODA Team Leader etc. I am betting this will be popular with SF field grades. The second option is to hire competent people to take charge of these elements. Set up lower ranking people called lieutenants to be in charge of platoons and a rank called captain to command companies and ODAs. These leaders would give operations orders to their respective subordinate units. (NOTE: I did not write CONOP.) As part of this OPORD they will include a part that tells what their intent is and what the subordinate unit’s mission is. They will then receive back briefs as necessary and supervise.

7) Problem: Operations take six hours or more to be approved. (QRF and MEDEVAC packages not included)

Discussion: The U.S. Army at war takes pride in ‘being inside the decision curve of the enemy.’ I remember missing the birthday party for the provincial Governor’s son in Afghanistan. The party took place 450 meters from the front gate of my FB. After having our ‘5W’ (type of CONOP designed for rapid approval) delayed for hours it was denied on the basis that we did not have at least two checkpoints on the route in addition to the start point and end point. These checkpoints had to be at least 250 meters apart despite the fact that our final destination was a mere 450 meters from our FB. After some ‘spirited’ emails involving math and two hours after the party was over we received approval to go to the party that was within grazing fire range from the FB. Needless to say some rapport was lost with the governor who had personally driven to the FB to invite us to the party. In addition, we got our butts chewed for not executing an approved CONOP. Meanwhile a patrol pulls out of a base in Iraq and 30 minutes later it receives small arms fire from a well-positioned enemy element that received early warning from observers near the FOB. Looks like we need to add ‘decision curves’ to our math class because the enemy is well within ours. Now imagine a cyber attack that only jams up the internet or eats email. So much for fighting the war during that deployment.
[NOTE: I promised to only use personally experienced events so I did not use the story about the ODA that had Bin Laden pinpointed during TORA BORA but had to wait for hours for approval to conduct the raid. For arguments sake lets say it was a dry hole to begin with. Can someone explain to me why it would take hours to approve an ODA to attempt to capture the most wanted man alive during an operation that was specifically executed to capture said most wanted man alive.]

Solution: See solution for problem 6.

8) Problem: No less than eight ‘Trigger Pullers’ are allowed on a mission or outside the wire.

Discussion: This is another ‘policy’ put in place that really does not meet the purpose or common sense test. Rumor has it that the ‘Policy’ was put in place after a two man sniper team was killed. Doctrine still states that scout sniper teams are two men, LRS teams are six men, and ODAs should be able to conduct split team (six men) ops. If we are not going to train as we fight then why train? Losing soldiers is never a good thing. Losing a war because you are unwilling to take casualties is not only worse, it will result in higher casualties and wasted sacrifice.

Solution: Either update our doctrine and MTOE or stop being risk averse.

9) Problem: Even if conducting reconnaissance operations, vehicles will be marked with reflective tape, VS-17 panels, unit frequency, and use IR strobes.

Discussion: How many times have we heard about the enemy’s top-notch early warning (EW) system? My three year old daughter could warn me if you tried to sneak up on me like that. If we’re going to put all of these requirements on the vehicles, why did we even paint the vehicles tan to begin with. The good thing is the enemy has NVGs so the strobes help to keep contact to a minimum unless they want to hit us. I fail to see where putting your communications channel in big numbers on the back of your vehicles constitutes being OPSEC-savvy. I have seen some units take off their 6” bumper numbers for OPSEC reasons. This way the enemy can not tell what unit you are in. That is, until the enemy sees 2’ tall numbers spelling out the communications channel written on the back of you vehicle. Since different units use different channels guess what other piece of info you gave the enemy. Now there is the argument that helicopters and airplanes can not distinguish friend from foe. For some reason they cannot tell that the large box-like HMMWV, MRAP, Bradley, Stryker, etc located in the same place as the BFT marker is friendly. There is also an argument for the comms channels on the back of vehicles that derives from a need to talk with ground units from the air despite every battle space having a common frequency that is supposed to be monitored. There are also supposed to be at least two BFTs per patrol. Let us pretend that US soldiers are driving you down a road that has a lot of IED activity. They can take one of two vehicles. Vehicle #1 is marked with all the above listed items and vehicle #2 is only painted desert tan. Illumination is at 25% and the enemy has one set of Russian NVGs and an EFP. Which vehicle do you want to take?

Solution: Buy the pilots that can not tell an MRAP from a Toyota Hilux some eyeglasses. Add BFTs to helicopters and airplanes. Set up a universal ‘Go to hell’ everything is broken SC PT freq for everyone to be able to use anywhere in theater. Train the GFC to call in air strikes so that they can control the aircraft and not get bombed. Maybe even put a preformatted call for fire format in the BFT so that less experienced soldiers can send the order. Develop a doctrine for following noise and light discipline as mush as possible. i.e. engine noise can not be helped but IR strobes and reflective tape will get you pinpointed.

10) Problem: Units can not conduct operations longer than 96 hours long.

Discussion: Why did we do a ten day patrol in Florida phase? I thought we trained as we fought. Did I miss something or did we unionize? A patrol or mission should be ‘out of the wire’ as long as necessary. Can you imagine fighting D-Day the way we fight now? In theory, the limited duration of operations helps maintain the troops. Have we gotten so used to 96 hour Banana Republic
wars that we cannot be more than 96 hours away from going to the MWR again. I will point out the purpose test again. One of the major shifts in tactics with the surge was getting people off the FOBs not trying to keep them there.

Solution: Conduct missions to standard not time. Conduct training that increases the endurance of our soldiers.

11) Problem: All dismounted operations to include reconnaissance operations will be compromised from the start.

Discussion: Fact: as soon as you pull out the gate or drive by a town the enemy starts keeping tabs on you. Translation: you are compromised. Another technique is to come in by helicopter. After all, they are harder to track. While in some cases it maybe possible to use this technique, truth is the enemy is almost always aware of helicopter landings. False insertions help by increasing the amount of possible sites thereby diluting the tracking capability of the enemy. There are only two ways to be inserted without the enemy knowing something is up from the start: falling from the sky and rising from the water. These will probably up the risk assessment a bit. If we use the COA idea I proposed and add the fact that now that small reconnaissance team is not starting out compromised then that will no longer be an issue.

Solution: Create schools that teach airborne and subsurface infiltration techniques. Create units that can use these techniques to defeat enemy EW.
Commanders unwilling to use these techniques should be removed from the chain of command for units capable of performing these techniques.

12) Problem: All operations to include dismounted operations will require the soldiers to carry no less than 60 lbs. of gear.

Discussion: A Taliban soldier once said ‘I move through the mountains caring a loaf of bread an AK-47 and two magazines. You chase me carrying tens of kilos of equipment. Why do you think you will catch me?’ This is another instance of a tool predicating reliance upon it. Several units have a rule about wearing every bit of the issued body armor 24/7. That is approximately 40 pounds and we still have not picked up a gun. This is also approximately 20 quarts of water. Why are we wearing a CQB uniform on a dismounted patrol in the mountains?

Solution: Make uniform wear a commander’s decision as part of the COA development.


13) Problem: Units are told to avoid areas where enemy contact has been made.

Discussion: There stood a Brigade CSM asking why a unit would want to go to an area that another unit “Got their asses handed to them.” While the unit did take a couple of WIA no soldiers on our side died. Now here is a CSM questioning a soldiers desire to go to an area now confirmed to have an enemy presence. I am glad no one said that to the 101st during the Battle of the Bulge

Solution: We need to get rid of leadership that is so scared of casualties that it does not want to go where the enemy is or we will start losing wars.

14) Problem: Not being able to conduct night-time operations or drive off road.

Discussion: Assets were sending a live feed of 17 Scania trucks coming from another country straight into a suspected enemy logistical area in Iraq. Sense the Infantry unit controlling the feed was not allowed interdict the intelligence was passed immediately to the battle space owner. The battle space owner decisively responded with. ‘We do not have anything that rolls at night.’ There went over 200 tons of supplies. Second example CF is to conduct a cordon of a village in support of an IA air assault. The IA was to land at dawn the cordon was to be in place 30 minutes prior. One of the tank drivers was asked why they were using the hardball instead of the dirt roads with less EW and why they were setting up their cordon almost six hour early; he responded we do not know how to drive off road or at night never mind both. Both these units were CAV units. I only mention that because this was not some 82nd soldier given a tank. It was a branch devoted to driving around a battle field.

Solution: I suggest we make a Mission Essential Tasks List (METL).
All units should be required to be able to perform the tasks on there list.
One example might be a vehicle borne unit’s ability to drive at night cross-country. All commanders should report their ability to perform the tasks on their list. Any commander found to falsify that report be relieved. We have captured several enemy truck drivers. We should turn as many of them as possible so that they can teach the U.S. Army how to drive our off road vehicle at night off road. After all they can drive convoys of Scania trucks at night off road without thermals, NVGs, and BFTs.

15) Problem: Not conducting Air Assaults within small arms range of an objective. Hot LZs are automatic aborts. Not conducting helicopter flight at night because it is too dangerous. Not conducting helicopter operations during the day because it is too dangerous

Discussion: I added these together because of similar solutions. Oddly enough I encountered this in the same theater during the same day by 2 different aviation units to go to the same PZ. Sadly enough it was for a CASEVAC.

Solution: Bring back the Vietnam-era pilots. Train soldiers and pilots to do thing like repel and fast rope onto an objective. Cross train with Colombian pilots. They frequently deliver soldiers into the jungle and land in hot LZs. Devote part of Paragraph 1 of the OPORD to enemy situation take measures to avoid specific threats.

General Marshall removed many general officers who moved up in the ranks in a peacetime Army just prior to the start of WWII. Right now, many of my peers, motivated company grade officers who have only known war are getting discouraged and leaving the Army in droves. Furthermore, Soldiers do not understand why they cannot simply seek and destroy the enemy. Soldiers are asking why they do not look like the soldier on the right hand side of the Infantry home page banner when on patrol. Soldiers are asking why the chain of command is so scared. If we do not organizationally rid ourselves of this scourge called risk aversion we will lose wars. It is time to bring back the Warrior Ethos in spirit instead of just in writing.

Ladies and Gentlemen:

How hard is it to get an exceptional policy letter for AR 40-501 chapter 2 paragraph 13f ?

Best,
adrbuddy

Well of course some GO's and some CSM's cash in - how do you think that the ACU came about? I bet if you look at the contractor who got the awarded contract - you will see that there is probably a GO on the board. Not even 10% sure, but I feel pretty darned confident.

The Army recently ordered 2,500 Taser guns in an ongoing effort to give soldiers alternatives to using deadly force.

Law enforcement units have used Tasers for years, but the Army only began issuing them to combat units in the summer of 2008 as part of the Brigade Non-Lethal Capabilities Set program.

The X26 ECD Taser, made by TASER International, looks and feels like a toy pistol. But it fires a special cartridge containing two tiny, barbed darts designed to penetrate up to one inch of clothing out to about 35 feet.

The darts spread apart during flight. Once they strike the target, the coiled wires connected to the Taser create an electrical arc between the two darts that reaches an intensity of 50,000 volts.

The voltage is then spread out over 19 pulses per second for five seconds and causes the recipient’s muscles to lock, rendering him temporarily immobilized.


Article: http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/1...taser_111609w/

I am retired and would like to obtain copies of my promotion certificates. Does anyone have the address where I might order copies of the promotions? Please resond to roglersle@aol.com. Thanks!

The Corps of Engineers is investigating the recent loss of an external hard drive that could pose identify theft problems for as many as 60,000 soldiers and Army civilians.

Maj. Mark Young, a Corps of Engineers spokesman in Washington, said the security breach occurred in the command’s Southwestern Division, which is headquartered in Dallas, in early November.

“Right now the focus is on investigating [the incident], alerting people who may be affected, and taking measures to make sure it doesn’t happen again,” he said.

Information stored on the missing hard drive includes personal data, such as names and Social Security numbers, on a number of current and former soldiers and some civilian employees, according to information provided by the Southwest Division.

Most of the affected population includes soldiers whose files went before the Fiscal 2008 sergeant first class and 2008 master sergeant promotion boards, and the 2007 colonel promotion board and the 2009 lieutenant colonel command board.

“Those who may be impacted by this incident will be notified electronically through the Army Knowledge Online Web site, or by mail,” according to a statement issued by Southwest Division Nov. 13.

Officials said that as of that date, there were no known cases of identify theft associated with the lists.

This is not the first time that the personal information on the 30,812 soldiers considered by the 2008 sergeant first class board has been compromised.

Just weeks after the board adjourned in February 2008, the Army’s Criminal Investigation Command determined that an advance version of the list made available to commanders and their designated representatives had been improperly posted on the Internet.

Within days of that finding, CID officials also determined that a listing of 20,048 soldiers considered by the 2005 master sergeant board had been compromised.

Those findings were particularly troubling because until last year, commander copies of lists not only included the names of all soldiers selected and not selected by a board, but their Social Security numbers.

The Army continues to allow designated commanders access to select and non-select lists, but does not include any part of a soldier’s Social Security number on the lists.

Database security and the threat of identify theft is a major problem in both the government and private sector, according to the Open Security Foundation.

According to data maintained by this nonprofit organization, there have been 363 major incidents this year of data breaches involving personal identifying information.

Included are the compromise of personal data in 6,675 files maintained by the Boston University Army ROTC battalion, and 130,000 soldier files maintained by the Army National Guard.

The Federal Trade Commission identity theft Web site provides helpful information for people who believe their personal information has been compromised.


Article: http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/1...reach_111309w/
FTC Identity Theft Site: http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/idtheft/

I saw this story on yahoo news earlier today. Im not in Afghanistan but I know the morale is low here in Iraq too. I feel that its because of how garrison it has become over here. Soldiers will pull missions and then come back late into the night and be expected to do 0530 PT formations. This is but one example of many situations that soldielrs are faced with. Also units who have little or no mission as opposed to units who seem to have the weight of the world on their shoulders. Soldiers are not deaf dumb and blind and they see higher ups taking days off, getting plenty of sleep, spending time at MWR and burger king while they pull 13-18 hour shifts. I've seen issues with Senior NCOs who say flat out "I will not go out side the wire" in the same meeting where they have to give names of soldiers for convoys. I see NCOs who are so buddy buddy with their soldiers that other soldiers feel alienated and left out. Its a big mess! My father joined the army in 1967 and retired in 1989 and when I tell him about what goes on you can see true dissapointment in his eyes. Morale, as far as I can see, is almost non existant. What ever happened with pride, honor, loyalty...Some one stated RHIP is in full effect as well as the buddy system. Until we get back on track and
NCOs live the values and ensure that they are passed on to their soldiers without regard to how cool that soldier is or whether or not they drink together on weekends.
I understand that there will always be favoritism but personnel in higher positions need to knuckle up and lead as they would want to be lead.
Its been a while since I saw an NCO wait to eat until his soldiers have eaten. I've also seen NCOs bed down before soldiers or leave them without information when it is needed. Just recently a SSG wanted a SGT to counsel a soldier for not being to guard on time. The SGT explained that he had changed the duty roster to reflect other changes and the SSG counseled the SGT for failure to follow a direct order for not counseling the soldier.
Now ask yourself why morale is so low.

OK, so this has been bugging me for awhile now and I cannot find it in the reg. anywhere!!! Are those elastic things that females are wearing as headbands authorized while in either ACUs or PT uniform? Someone please help me out with this. I know some females need to show that they are feminine and wear that type of stuff which is fine, but we have to do the right thing just as much as the males do. Help me out!!!!

:mad: It makes me mad when i pick up Army times and i read an article about Salsa dancing, yoga clubs, etc... . After 5 deployments in 16 yrs I have experienced stress of combat zones, separation from family and a lot more. So my question is, so what?. What is a soldier to do to release stress and forget about where he/she is?. Those who critique the military so much, i invite u to put on the uniform and come join us. Then experience some of our daily chore and then tell me about some things u can do to forget about deployments and stress.

SSG Daviage wrote a letter complaining about his reenlistment bonus being only $3,000.00 vs the bonues of soldiers that haven't served as long. He also wanted to know if the Army just stops supporting career soldiers after a certain period of time due to their longivity. I can only speak for the old Army. I spent over 22 years on active duty and during the entire career, my reenlistment bonus could not exceed $2,000.00 over that entire period. I'm sure older retirees have similar stories. The Army will always continue to improve to retain certain career eligible soldiers. Note that I said 'certain'. If you are in an overage MOS, you have to consider reclassification into a shortage MOS if you want to reap the benefits. Same with rank. I'm sure that hasn't changed. The rank goes to the MOS' that are short, especially combat arms. Sitting behind a desk will not get you promoted very fast, unless of course you can be spared to attend on duty classes to improve on your education and leading to a degree. It doesn't stop with active duty. Us retirees have been fodder for cuts for many years now and some of us even have to pay for our own VA compensation out of our retirement checks. And just when you purchased a retirement home in an area that looked pretty good as far as entitlements like the PX and Commmissary, they decide to close the post and the facilities, thus leaving you to shop elsewhere on the economy. The only real benefit is the Commissary. I've noticed PX prices higher than some places on the economy. The old Army PX always had cheaper pricing, no question about it. I suppose it's all about money and screw the troop and retiree. So SSG Daviage, if you are planning to retire, get ready for more inequities. In answer to your question if the Army takes care of it's own..... I'll leave that for you to figure out on your own. For this retiree, I cannot say the Army has done much to support me at all. Once you are used up, you are thrown out to rot and they hope you don't live very long so they can save on your retirement pay.

I am more than disappointed to hear that there is a new policy restricting soldiers in attending OCS. Now you have to have a 4 year college degree? is this true ? Come on ! ... Why are we giving our backs to non traditional students. Students who have to work hard full time and go to school part time at times. What about those older experience soldiers who are more than eligible to be part of leadership for their dedication. ? Policies as these are killing our Army..
:(

After a suggestion by MACHINE666, I submitted the following letter to Col. Oliver North at Fox News "War Stories" at warstories@foxnews.com If you think this suggestion has merit, maybe a note from other service members to Col North may help get it on the air.

ChiefB


Fox News War Stories

Dear Colonel North

Your thorough reports of our service members on the front lines in Iraq and Afghanistan have always been the most in-depth and enlightening insights of all media.


The subject of interminable, inhumane deployment and redeployment schedules that have been tasked of our forces and how it is affecting the very survival of our service members and their families needs exposure.


Please consider the following subject for one of your “War Stories” reports:



When is the DOD going to realize, admit and correct the fact that the US Army and Marines are undermanned, over tasked, fatigued, and living a tortuous regimen of deployment after cruel deployment to their own detriment and unnecessarily risking their mental and physical health or their lives?


The USAF and Navy are augmenting, (called In Lieu Of or ILO forces), the Army and they are also suffering from deployment fatigue. Suicides, divorces, family breakups, bankruptcies are all up and climbing, for all services. Now, the Ft. Hood incident has added to their anxiety.


When are they (our leaders) going to stop this inhumane treatment of our brothers in arms?


I for one am disgusted with our military leadership not coming to the table with a demand of our political leadership to get their head out of the sand and rescue our valiant forces from absolute chaos. Not a request, a demand. I want to see resignations before they will relent. I want to see some courage for this cause.


It is madness, just madness to maintain this interminable rotation in and out of war.


Families are disintegrating, marriages are dissolving and life for our forces is just one foot in hell and the other on a banana peel.


The DOD needs to quit playing with numbers, shortening tours, lengthening tours, and refusing to recognize that the Army and Marines are too small and too overcommitted to be spread so thin.

Something has to give and the record shows that regardless of the valiant effort of our service members, it’s their families, their health and their lives.

Very respectfully,

ChiefB

This guy's actually been in the job well over a year:

http://www.usma.edu/CSM/CSMbio.asp

OK, now I will say that he's been recruiting and in USAREC jobs over 20 years, but how do you go from a recruiting command job to West Point? If they were looking at putting him somewhere, maybe downrange would have been a good idea.

I came into the Army in August of 2006, before then I was working for UPS for 4 months. I gave them a copy of my orders from MEPS and they put me on 3 years military leave. I asked my prior location I worked at if I can come back to work but I have to re apply and was told I was terminated though all I have paper work wise is pay stubs and 401K information. Should I have JAG help me or just look elsewhere ?

FORT LEAVENWORTH, Kan. — Texas billionaire and two-time presidential candidate Ross Perot has pledged $6.1 million to a private foundation to pay for programs at the Army’s Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth.

Army majors spend 10 months at the school preparing for unit command or staff positions.

A top general at the college says Perot’s pledge will help the Army expand ethics training for officers and bolster cooperation between the military and government agencies such as the FBI.

The 79-year-old Perot said he made the pledge after discussing history with a class of officers at the college last month.

He said the college is doing a great job with important work.

Perot graduated from the Naval Academy and served four years in the Navy.


Article: http://www.militarytimes.com/news/20...t_gift_110609/

25L02, stationed in Fort Carson would like to swap with any 25L02 from anywhere please contact myself A.S.A.P, robynrene.edwards@att.blackberry.net.

Okay, so, here's the deal for you Army folks who have been benefiting from free Air Force bodies since 9/11...

If the USAF ever had a Chief of Staff with some balls, he would've told the Army years ago that the free ride is over. Just because the Army screwed up their combat support ratios doesn't mean that we all should suffer.

The Army has been getting a free ride from the AF and Navy with thousands of enlisted and non-rated bodies, AND IT SHOULD END NOW.

Questions?

I would like to propose a topic that I have brought up in another websites forum. I would like to see a special pay for those enlisted who hold post high school degrees. I know that there are quality NCOs out there who hold Associates, Bachelors, and even Masters degrees but do not want to become Officers. There is a huge pay gap between enlisted and officer. Many enlisted get out of the Army in hopes of making more money on the outside once their degree is complete. We lose many quality leaders every year due to this. I propose that the Army give a special pay to these enlisted who chose to stay in once they obtain either of these levels of education. Perhaps $200 extra a month for obtaining an Associates, $300 for a Bachelors, and $400 for a Masters. This will help the Army two fold; it will give an incentive for enlisted to further thier education which will in turn make them more well-rounded leaders, and will work to keep quality NCOs within our ranks. Let me know what your thoughts are on this.

An Army helicopter crashed into the fast combat support ship Arctic during a joint training exercise with SEALs Thursday night off Virginia Beach, Va., killing one service member and injuring eight.

The locally based SEALs were training on fast-roping onto the Arctic from the Black Hawk helicopter in a simulated maritime interdiction when the crash occurred.

A second Army helicopter in the exercise was able to evacuate the wounded to a nearby hospital.

Neither Army nor Navy officials would identify the name or service branch of the casualty.

“I am not going to put that out right now,” said Lt. Cmdr. Phil Rosi, spokesman at Fleet Forces Command in Norfolk, noting that the killed and injured were all aboard the helicopter, not the ship.

He said four of the eight were no longer under medical care, and the four who remain in the hospital do not have life-threatening injuries.

“The process of the investigation has begun, but we have not assigned an investigating officer on this yet,” because of the joint nature of the incident, he said.

SEAL units do not have their own helicopters and often fly with the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, the Army’s sole special operations aviation unit. The 160th is an element of the Army’s Special Operations Command, based at Fort Bragg, N.C.

Neither Army SOC nor the regiment’s spokesman would comment about the crash.

“I cannot confirm whether or not it was our aircraft,” said Maj. Brandon Bissell, spokesman for the 160th SOAR. “We are still working through the details.”

Members of the Fort Campbell, Ky.-based regiment, which flies several types of helicopters, are known as the Night Stalkers. They gained some public notice after the October 1993 debacle in Mogadishu, Somalia, portrayed in the book and movie “Black Hawk Down.”

Crumpled wreckage
Photos of the Arctic pierside in Norfolk show the wrecked helicopter crumpled into the superstructure of the Military Sealift Command ship, the aircraft on its side and partially covered by a tarp.

The helicopter appears to be equipped with a fixed probe for in-flight refueling. The probe juts off the side of the ship.

Some versions of the Black Hawk flown by the 160th, including the MH-60L Direct Action Penetrator, can be equipped with a refueling probe.

Navy helicopters that operate off warships with confined flight decks are not equipped with fixed refueling probes.

Although SEAL units do not have their own helicopters, the Navy’s Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron 84 specializes in working with special operations forces.

Bissell said Army 160th aircrews do train in “over-water” missions such as operating with Navy ships.

“We are continuously training on different mission profiles,” he said.

This is not the first accident involving special operations forces practicing vertical ship boardings.

On Dec. 9, 1999, a Marine CH-46 got tangled in flight deck safety netting on the fleet oiler Pecos off San Diego during a vertical boarding training by a force reconnaissance unit. The helicopter flipped and fell overboard sinking quickly, killing seven aboard. Eleven survivors were quickly plucked from the water by boat-borne SEALs who were also part of the exercise.


Article: http://www.militarytimes.com/news/20...ocrash_102309/