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#41
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#42
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#43
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I recommend B52Av8tor's post for an op-ed position in next week's AF Times.
__________________
In every democracy, the people get the government they deserve - Alexis de Tocqueville |
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#44
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Totally agree
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#45
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I respectfully second that nomination!
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#46
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All in favor...AYE!
Brilliant!
__________________
The Voice of Reason Guardian of Freedom and Justice, My nation's Sword and Shield, Its Sentry and Avenger. C:<enter>:###
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#47
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I would like to offer something that has eluded us for more than a bit—the definition of the word culpability. Culpability is defined by Meriam-Websters as “blameworthy”, and what is more disheartening is that it appears this word has vanished from the vocabulary of some people. I know it is dangerous to speak in generalities when it comes to specific areas, but as I read that the AF has lost two more Wing commanders at the same base for losing their commander’s confidence, it sends up a blazing red flag and siren that there is a much deeper problem here. Minot has suffered a rash of reliefs, and as is more often the case than not, the Wing CCs were responsible for the behavior of their subordinates. What appears to be missing from the equation is, “Who else is culpable in this scenario?” This enterprise requires steadfast behavior and internalization of the mission; if not, things go woefully wrong, and someone is answerable. Unfortunately, and this is one of those dangerous generalizations, we have created a culture of searching for the next “shiny thing” that will get people promoted, so core competencies are lost to individuals looking to get that block checked before moving on. While some do extremely well while assigned to it, others just don’t seem to get it…at all. These individuals move along after their assignment with their ratings and block checked without repercussion. The only ones that appear to make the headlines are the Wing CCs themselves. Unfortunately, others share culpability in this failure and should be treated equally, especially if they are specialists in their areas. Not only should they be removed from their positions, but it should also reflect in their promotion capabilities such as OPR/EPR ratings and the likes. In this enterprise, there is no such thing as a “You problem”, it’s an “Us problem”.
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#48
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I think I'll scream if I hear someone using the word "enterprise" again! The most over used buzz word of the last couple of years!
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#49
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If that's all you got out of the post, then you may have missed the point,,, |
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#50
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I guess my main question (and you may be able to answer it) what are the actual functions of those NAF's you've listed below? I can only speak for AFCENT/9AF because of my relationship with them. I know for a fact what they were doing in the desert and know that it was a reccomendation of CENTCOM/CC that we should split it because the 3-Star in charge was not able to equally balance his ADCON control over his area (Southeastern CONUS) and his OPCON control of two theaters. He was essentially always gone and his Vice was basically the ADCON Commander. Working in USSOUTHCOM, 12AF was just an ADCON to us as well and the 612ABS reported directly to ACC for their Policies and Procedures. We only went to 12AF for requests in manpower/money/etc. USNORTHCOM is the same way with the NAF's it has control over, they are just there for ADCON between the Units, nothing more. However, with the AO's you specified with 3AF and 13AF I could see them having both controls though. |
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