GAO: Rush to field MRAPs could be costly - Military News | News From Afghanistan, Iraq And Around The World - Military Times

GAO: Rush to field MRAPs could be costly

The Pentagon’s rush to field thousands of Mine Resistant Ambush Protective vehicles in Iraq may result in lower performance and higher costs in the long-run, according to a Government Accountability Office report.

The Defense Department launched its high-priority MRAP program in early 2007 to counter enemy homemade bombs responsible for roughly 75 percent of the casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan. The $22 billion effort was designed to purchase and field up to 15,000 MRAPs as quickly as possible.

Since then, DoD’s “tailored acquisition approach” has fielded more than 6,600 MRAP vehicles, but “it has also increased performance, sustainability, and cost risks,” the GAO’s July 15 report states.

“Safety and performance testing is not yet complete, and any shortcomings revealed may require design changes or post manufacturing fixes, the report states. The three phases of developmental tests, which began in March 2007, are not scheduled to be completed until August.

Awarding contracts to five difference companies — Navistar Defense, Force Protection Industries, BAE Tactical Vehicle Systems, BAE Ground Systems and General Dynamics Land Systems-Canada Corporation — will likely result in future challenges as well, the GAO maintains.

“Operating, maintaining, and sustaining a fleet of more than 15,000 fielded vehicles manufactured by at least five different vendors could also present significant challenges—especially for the Army, whose fleet will include more than 10,000 vehicles from five manufacturers” the report states. “Future budgets could be significantly affected by these challenges, particularly since the department is still determining its cost estimate to operate and sustain the current MRAP quantities.”

The GAO also pointed out that the future of MRAP may be short-lived, which could make things worse.

“As threats change, performance requirements — and MRAP’s role in DOD’s overall tactical wheeled vehicle strategy — could change, further exacerbating these challenges,” the report states.